Institutional change and environmental protection: public trusts and other reforms by Applegate, Rick
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1979 
Institutional change and environmental protection: public trusts 
and other reforms 
Rick Applegate 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Applegate, Rick, "Institutional change and environmental protection: public trusts and other reforms" 
(1979). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8630. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8630 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
Th i s  i s  an unpublished  manuscript  i n  which copyright  sub­
s i s t s . Any further r e p r i n t in g  of i t s  contents must be approved
BY THE a u t h o r .
MANSFIELD L ib r a r y  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Montana 
Date:  19 7 9_____
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
PUBLIC TRUSTS AND OTHER REFORMS
By
Rick Applegate
B.A., University of Montana, 1970
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 
1979
Approve^-by
Chairman, Board of Examiners
 — C.— J..:.
Dean, Graduate School
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP39431
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,




Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ABSTRACT
Applegate, Rick, M.S., 1979 Environmental Studies
Institutional Change and Environmental Protection: Public Trusts
and Other Reforms (171 pp.)
Director: David Emmons
This study outlines the key weaknesses in the American pursuit 
of environmental quality, including the failure to consider 
systematically the claims of future generations, the excessive 
reliance on agency discretion, the inadequate programs for citizen 
involvement in resource decisions, and the fragmentary enforcement 
of property owner obligations. It is concluded that these 
weaknesses are signs of institutional failure.
A proposed remedy— the public trust approach— is explored and 
recommended. The central feature of the public trust approach is 
the creation of legal duties to manage critical resources as 
trustees of the environment for future generations, not simply as 
current-day proprietors. The trust approach includes legal 
mechanisms to insure that important resources are neither degraded 
nor wasted. Related institutional reforms— including a re-examination 
of the National Environmental Policy Act--are analyzed.
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INTRODUCTION
Ecology has become the Thing. There are 
ecological politics, ecological jokes, ecological 
bookstores, advertisements, seminars, teach-ins, 
buttons. The automobile, symbol of ecological abuse, 
has been tried, sentenced to death, and formally 
executed in at least tvo universities (complete vith 
burial of one victim). Publishing companies are 
fattening on books on the sonic boom, poisons in the 
things ve eat, perils loose in the garden, the dangers 
of breathing. The Saturday Review has appended a 
regular monthly Ecological Supplement.^
As noted by Robert Heilbroner in his essay, "Ecological Armageddon," 
environmental quality has received an enormous amount of attention since 
the late 1960*s. In addition to the obvious signs he mentions, there has 
been a virtual landslide of environmental legislation and litigation. On 
a crisis by crisis basis, federal, state, and local governments —  prodded 
by citizens and groups —  have stumbled into the structuring of environmental 
décisîon-making institutions and have been called upon to analyze these 
decisions and to interpret and apply a plethora of statutes and administra­
tive regulations. The field of environmental law has been characterized 
accurately as "the law ablaze." A vast body of conqplex and not-always- 
consistent case law has resulted.
Despite this surge of promising activity, all is not well, environ­
mentally speaking. As Heilbroner warned, ecological issues have "assumed 
the dimensions of a vasb popular fad, for which one can predict with 
reasonable assurance the trajectory of all such fads —  a period of intense
“ 1 -
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popular involvement, followed by growing boredom and gradual extinction,
psave for a diehard remnant of the faithful." However, he does not end 
on this note of pessimism- Instead, he expresses the hope that the new 
ecological awareness and concern provide "the possibility for a new 
political rallying ground" —  and a new social direction.^ Lately, 
however, it has become clear that this new movement and new direction 
have not materialized. Several reasons can be offered.
For example, the environmental movement, like a number of other 
public efforts, does not represent a clearly defined constituency. This 
poses the fundamental, knee-weakening question: Whom do you represent?
Too, environmental groups have not often formed close ties with other 
groups working on social and political issues, especially, in general, 
with respect to the movement for economic justice, although some promising 
new initiatives are under w a y W h i l e  each drive could benefit from the 
insights and influence of the other, few serious, long-term alliances have 
been formed. This has resulted in some inter-group fitting and reduced 
effectiveness.
Another reason is that the environmental movement itself is split 
into at least three groups: full- or part-time activists, low energy
lifestyle communitarians, and apathetics. Even within the activist sector 
there are divergent, and sometimes undefined, strategies. In addition, 
the standard environmentalist posture is generally reactive rather than 
anticipatory. This is not necessarily a chosen stance, but one crisis 
after another preempts time that could be used to form alliances, define 
strategies, and conceive new general directions for the long-run.̂
Finally, and perhaps decisively, citizen environmental groups are 
very low-budget operations. The lack of adequate financial resources
is one of the greatest obstacles to concerted environmental action.
- 2 “
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■ What, then, is the status of the environmental law landslide that the 
environmental movement has helped promote? Over six years after the first 
Earth Day, the major effects of the environmental effort are still in douht.̂
On the one hand, airsheds and watersheds in some areas are cleaner and,
ecologically speaking, more viable; the SST was sidetracked, although it 
now lands here; and numerous environmental statutes have been enacted. On 
the other hand, the overall policy framework for environmental decisions 
is not functioning well.^ The direction is not clear.
For example, whether a non-degradation policy for air quality will
be adopted is still being debated in the courts. Congress, and the
AEnvironmental Protection Agency. The Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act—  a new approach to water quality —  is languishing. (Very little 
has been accomplished with respect to groundwater pollution and non-point 
sources of water pollution, such as agriculture and silviculture ; the close 
relationship between water pollution and water appropriation —  diversion of 
water from streams —  is not covered; there is an interagency dispute hampering 
control of radioactive discharges into wa t e r a n d  the efforts to encourage 
effective citizen participation in water quality decisions have been 
largely unproductive.^®) While wildlife habitat and prime agricultural 
land are chewed up at alarming rates, there is no national land use policy^^—
even for public lands. The same is true for national energy policy and
■1 ostrip mining legislation. (A number of states are proceeding on a trial 
and error basis with strip mine reclamation and various approaches to land 
use p l a n n i n g . T h e  Occupational Safety and Health Act is under fire and 
is nowhere near full implementation.^^ Only recently were steps taken to 
establish comprehensive toxic substances legislation.^^ The Council on 
Environmental Quality, created in 1970, is a fine agency on paper and has 
produced some useful studies; its impact on resource decisions, however, 
is d u b i o u s . a
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The list could go on —  and could, of course, reflect more of the specific 
accomplishments of the environmental movement. Even so, the list vould 
remain mostly one of dubious and partial accomplishments.
The overriding reason for this stalemate is not the failure of move­
ment politics, not the lack of a more visible constituency, not the in­
fighting mentioned previously, not even administrations hostile to environ­
mental concerns. While these remain significant stumbling blocks, the 
chief difficulty is the substantive failure to re-orient political and 
economic institutions so they conform to ecological realities and involve 
clearly enforceable duties consonant with those realities. It is this 
political/legal failure —  a correctable one —  to which this report is 
addressed.
This study does not explore the obvious questions, which deserve 
careful consideration at an early date, that are raised by 
the inherent growth-for-growth's-sake tendency of modern corporations.
Suffice it to say that the corporate growth tendency is often environmentally 
destructive and must be scrutinized. Prominent possibilities for change 
include the development of small-scale economic institutions —  such as 
cooperatives, non-growth oriented corporations, and public service enter­
prises. In short, it is crucial to develop economic institutions that 
meet genuine human needs, not simply expand gross production.
Another question not addressed in this study is the adverse economic 
impact that environmental regulations can have. These adverse effects —  
primarily job and income displacement —  can be mitigated by careful antici­
pation. For example, where regulations terminate jobs, workers must be 
enabled to make an orderly transition to new jobs through training programs 
and injections of capital or technical assistance to provide new, more 
environmentally consonant employment opportunities, and so on. This is
-4-
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in simple recognition of the fact that vhen environmental quality is 
enhanced, many benefit; a few should not have to pay with their economic 
security for such widespread social gains.
-5-
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PART I
OBSTACLES TO 
THE PURSUIT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
A. Introduction
The failure to re-orient political and economic institutions manifests 
itself as six related problems.
(1) The environment is a complex, not-entirely-understood set of 
events and processes. We have developed no systematically applied 
methods for evaluating the risks of ecosystem modification or tampering.
(2) Existing property ownership is a convenient but overly simplistic 
grid imposed on ecological systems. It does not reflect the multi-faceted 
ecological character of the land and obstructs ecologically based land 
management.
(3) Human activities and institutional patterns tend to follow 
convenience or historical/technological imperatives rather than ecological 
realities and limitations.
(U) The basic needs and values of future generations are not repre­
sented in present-day decisions (nor are the "rights" of eco-systems).
This being the case, we risk foreclosing future options without explicitly 
considering them (and, in the case of ecosystem rights, we may pass up 
some important lessons that can be learned only from a more respectful 
attitude toward nature).
(5) The requisites for more effective citizen participation in environ­
mental decisions have not been completely identified or implemented.
-6~
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(6) The current system for environmental decision-making is decisively 
flawed. It reacts to problems rather than anticipating them; it does not 
routinely incorporate socio-economic concerns; it dubiously relies upon 
agency self-policing; and it commits too many decisions to the abyss of 
bureaucratic discretion.
B. Ecological Conç»lexity
John Muir once wrote that "when we try to pick out anything by itself,
17we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." Others have
stated this position. In dealing with the environment, it has been said,
l3"you can't just do one thing."
What does this mean when it comes time to make a decision that affects 
the environment? Surely the point is not that you must consider everything 
before doing anything. But since the Industrial Revolution, human ability 
to manipulate the environment has increased enormously. There is a 
corresponding tendency to try everything we appear technologically able 
to do. Our technological power, vast industrial organization and over-' 
whelming population increase require that we take far greater heed of 
ecological realities than we did a century ago.
As noted by ecologist Eugene Odum,
...man's power and willingness to alter environments 
has increased at a greater rate than man's under­
standing of said environments. Society now asks 
questions that cannot be adequately answered because 
of lack of data, and especially because theoretical 
models are not sufficiently firm to allow predictions 
that have a reasonable probability of being right....
.. .We must be on solid theoretical ground before we 
leap. We cannot afford trial and error procedures 
in many cases, because many alterations of the 
environment are not immediately reversible should we 
discover that the alteration was a mistake.^9 
(Emphasis added)
-7-
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How do we respond to this problem? Consider DDT, thalidomide, aldrin,
dleldrin, vinyl chloride, red dye #2, kepone, and the proliferation of other
potentially toxic and carcinogenic substances that may go a long way toward
explaining why the U.S. is number one in the incidence of a wide variety of 
20cancers. The Teton Dam disaster and strip mining in semi-arid environments
are only two of a host of other examples of our persistently optimistic trial
and error approach.
Our understanding of environmental complexity and risk does not very
frequently guide actual decisions by government or private parties. While
numerous actions have been modified to reduce their impacts, agencies and
corporations have not attempted to solve the more fundamental problem of
identifying anticipatory risk limits beyond which they will not go.^^ These
limits, or at least a solid procedure for examining them in advance, must
be developed or decisions will continue to run contrary to the fundamental
maxim that one should err on the safe side.
There is a crucial way to assure that the fragility and complexity
of ecological systems will be fully assessed and reflected in final decisions,
It is to structure an adversary institutional framework —  one that brings a
potent segment of the citizenry representing public, longer-term interests
into the decision making arena, whether it be the management offices of
major corporations, the barren halls of administrative agencies, or courts
of law and equity. It is the public trust approach.
C. Conventional Property Ownership Boundaries
The primary and conventional method for bounding property west of
the original colonies was developed in l8th century Congressional debates
on the disposal of public lands. These debates generally reflected a
desire to dispose of the vast public domain to produce revenue and promote
settlement-; For disposal purposes, the size of a township (six
- 8-
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miles sg,ua.re) vas established in part to avoid the sale of large blocks
pp
of public domain land to speculators. A grid of raile-square sections 
was soon imposed throughout the public domain; coupled with the various 
public land disposals, this grid resulted in the current patchwork and 
ecologically senseless mix of ownership (See Figure 1). Generally, ecologi­
cal constraints and conditions were not understood or considered in drawing 
these ownership lines.
The square mile grid may have appeared reasonable at the time. However, 
when land is classified for purposes of environmental management, the 
weakness of this method of bounding ownership is sharply demonstrated 
(See Figure 2). Matters of environmental importance— surface and ground­
water flows, wildlife habitat, soil productivity, and so on— do not follow 
section line grids. They depend on ecological factors such as topography, 
vegetative cover, and slope— not fence lines. Thus, with conventional 
boundaries, the environment’s important and related components are fragmented. 
Regulation of activities and protection of ecological values are hindered 
by the resulting ownership diversity.
This is not to say that we must undertake a massive— if not impossible- 
redrawing of property boundaries. Not only would this be politically 
improbable; it would also be ecologically ridiculous. Important ecological 
processes overlap, rendering any certain division of ownership unrealistic.
Rather than compound the initial error, the concept of ownership 
itself needs reassessment with the clear recognition that ownership patterns 
do not correspond to ecological limits. The "bundle of rights" and respon­
sibilities associated with property need to be shaped to respect, rather 
than ignore, ecological processes and impacts.
- 9 _
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DIFFERENT CLASSES OF PUBLIC LANDS AND MANY ORGANIZATIONS MEAN COMPLEX 
PLANNING ARRANGEMENTS
□  State 
Private
3 Forest Service 
1 BLM








(Source: Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land:
A  Report to the President and to the Congress (Washington, D.C.,: 
U. S, Government Printing Office, 1970) p. 58.)
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(Source: Public Land Law Review Commission, One_Third of the Nation's L̂ nd: 
A Report to the President and to the Congress (Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970) p. 80 )
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D. Conventional Human Activities
The conduct of human activities generally follows short-term convenience
imperatives. Americans have demonstrated almost no success with self-limita­
tion, particularly in nonrenewable resource consumption— except in those 
rare instances, such as war, where limitation was socially demanded.With 
a seemingly inexhaustible American land frontier, this waste posed no 
apparent difficulty. One could simply move on— over the next hill or across 
the river. Minerals, for example, seemed unceasingly available; and not 
until the Paley Commission of the 1950s was there serious public questioning 
of the nonrenewable resource future.
With the publication of Limits to Growth, the allegedly contrived 
energy crisis of the winter of 1973, and the increased likelihood of 
serious shortages in the near future, a heightened public debate on resource 
supplies b e g a n . T h e  basic argument of the growth skeptics is that the 
dizzying acceleration.of exponential growth can exhaust sizeable supplies 
of vital materials and imperil the viability of the earth environment.^^
Those more sanguine about the prospects and benefits of further growth 
argue that the growth of knowledge and technological advance— finding new 
ways to extract resources and finding new uses for presently unused materials, 
for example— will outrun the rapidly depleting reserves of critical materials.
While a crucial discourse on the limits to growth pits the speed of 
technological innovation against expotential or near-expotential growth in 
material consumption and its side effects, there are still few serious 
efforts underway to identify and slow the consumption and waste of critical 
materials. For example, in the United States we have no mandatory energy 
conservation program— in fact, almost no voluntary program. With the dis­
appearance of lines at service stations, people have hit the road again—
-1 2 ~
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as if the line were the key indicator. The shin to small cars is also 
endangered- We have no minerals conservation policies or programs.
Packaging and construction techniques still render important materials 
utterly irretrievable by mixing them with inseparables. Land use 
practices are not guided from the point of view of long-term economic or 
environmental efficacy (e.g. , the continuing sprawl subdivision of prime 
agricultural land and wildlife habitat).
The list could go on to include the horrifying reality that carcinogens—  
cancer-causing agents— are a routine part of meat packaging, dyes, and other 
goods we use daily. In sum, human activities are not conformed to a host 
of ecological constraints. Rather, they follow a convenient, business-as- 
usual strain, with very little long-term vision, even in the face of impending 
crisis.
We need to institutionalize an ecological perspective by requiring 
certain parties to evaluate environmental needs against the more short­
sighted, day-to-day concerns.
E. Institutions to Consider Future Generations
It may seem a commonplace observation to assert that future generations 
are not represented in present-day decisions. Of course they are not 
represented, one may say; they are not even here yet. One of the corner­
stones of American political theory, however, is the principle that persons 
affected by a decision ought to be represented in the making of that decision. 
That is a relatively straightforward generalization of the old slogan: 
"Taxation without representation is tyranny." However, in reality, the 
principle becomes a confusing, intractable proposition.
13 -
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How is it possible to represent future generations? Who can say with
certainty what will count with the unborn? What wi Î J their values and goals
be? What will be acceptable and what intolerable?
On the other hand, who can deny that the environmental decisions we
make today— whether it is preserving a wilderness, building a highway,
opening a mine, carving a road, harvesting timber, or constructing a nuclear
power plant— will help define the conditions of their lives?
It is odd— and on reflection, a damning indictment— that we assume an
unlimited right to bring children into the world and, at the same time,
we have not developed a single legal obligation to assure that those children
28have a viable future. At present, there simply are no institutions or 
representatives systematically evaluating the claims of coming generations.
We need to develop them.
F. Inadequate Citizen Participation
Although "citizen participation" is a frequently heard slogan, it is
in danger of becoming little more than that.
Consider the standard public hearing. Assume that due notice of the
• hearing is properly given. The citizens who can afford the time to prepare
testimony and travel to the hearing will probably be heard. However, what
is their leverage? What is to keep their views from vanishing into the
thin, smoky air of the hearing room? When they go home, what do the
agencies do in response to their efforts? How is the public input weighed
and evaluated? How is the final decision actually made?
There has been a great deal written on the contemporary absence of
effective citizen participâtion.^9 Writers have noted the complexity,
expense, irregularity, and indefinite results of participation. In
response, a number of attempts have been made to regularize administrative
-14-
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procedures, to open governmental meetings and documents to public review,
and to require agencies to encourage citizens to participate.^® In fact,
the National Environmental policy Act aims to compel a public account
31of major agency decisions. To this end, it requires the familiar environ­
mental impact statement (EIS).^^ However, shipping someone a four-pound EIS 
every month or so does not necessarily increase citizen participation. Indeed, 
the practice can actually discourage citizen interest. Too often, these 
documents are written— or hearings are held— simply to justify a decision 
already made, not, as the law requires, to encourage citizens to take part 
in the shaping of a final d e c i s i o n . I n  EiSs, agencies do not routinely 
highlight known controversies surrounding environmental data or the limitations 
of data collected and used- So, the public does not receive independent and 
balanced information. There is no funding available for citizens to gather 
their own data and present them for consideration. It is unclejir how the 
citizen’s views are evaluated in the decision-making process. And, it is 
not even clear whether we have genuine participation or mere input.
All these limitations reduce the chance that citizen action will be a 
potent force in environmental decisions. On virtually no other subject 
matter could this situation be more aggravating since citizen participation 
provides critical balance against the claims of groups seeking to influence 
resource decisions to suit their short-term profit/loss accounts;
G. Flawed Environmental Decision-Making
A key barrier to effective environmental decision-making is the amount
of discretion lodged within government agencies. Essentially private
judgments and biases are all too easily substituted for public justifications
in making decisions, and these discretionary judgments are not easily or
- 15-
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inexpensively revlewable. For example, halting ill-advised governmental "
actions often requires the use of an extraordinary judicial remedy, such 
as the ’’preliminary injunction.” Obtaining this remedy is quite difficult. 
There is a four-fold test that must be met by plaintiffs if a questionable 
activity is to be halted by a court:
1. There must be a legally defensible interest to be pro­
tected by the injunction.
2. The party seeking the injunction must demonstrate that 
the proposed activity would irreparably harm the party’s 
legally protected interest.
3. The injunction must confer public benefits.
U. The damage to the private interests enjoined must be 
balanced against the interests protected by the 
injunction.35
The second test— proving irreparable damage— is often difficult to pass, 
particularly in public health cases. Environmental effects may be cumulative 
over a period of years; they may not be recognized at the immediate site of 
the proposed activity; or they may otherwise be difficult to quantify.
So, as in so many other aspects of law and conventional practice, old 
remedies are ill-suited to the resolution of environmental disputes.
In addition, governmental decision-making on matters of environmental
importance is conducted from an essentially reactive posture. Typically,
a symptom such as foul water, or a major development proposal such as a
nuclear plant, triggers governmental investigation and action. Positive
planning in the two most critical environmental problem areas—
land use and energy —  is either non-existent, inconclusive, or compromised.
For example, the U.S. Forest Service multiple-use planning process,
which is an admirable attempt to plan for the future, glosses over more
than it resolves on basic environmental issues surrounding forest practices.
The plans very often do not deal clearly a.id directly with such principles
-16“
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and guides for acceptable forest management as sustained yield, allovable 
cut, or long-term economic analysis.The Bureau of Land Management—  
controlling some U50 million acres of the public domain— does not consider 
the interrelationship of adjacent private land activities in its public land 
planning. BLM planning is done from a property-bovmdary, rather than an
38ecological, perspective. Property boundaries also severely limit the 
activities of the U.S. Forest Service.
Several other difficulties in current environmental decision-making will
be discussed below. However, the primary problem was identified by Joseph Sax;
A fundamental misconception dominates [environmental] 
reform efforts. We hold stubbornly to the faith that 
the administrative agency must continue to be our 
central institution for environmental decision-making; 
as a result we continue to assume that some sort of 
patching up of procedures, of the vray the agencies do 
business, will bring significant c h a n g e .39 (Emphasis 
added)
Environmental decision-making relies too much on agency discretion. Decisions 
made in this context are neither consistent nor easily reviewable. Responsi­
bility, whether for agency error or failures to meet reasonable expectations, 
is difficult to focus.
H. Conclusion
Taken together, the above problems pose decisive obstacles to the
pursuit of environmental quality. We have not integrated our knowledge of
ecological complexity into our decision-making procedures. Continuing a
narrow, ecologically blind understanding of property rights will insure
that more comprehensive, ecologically based solutions will be unlikely.
Failing to conform human activities to ecological limitations--floodplalns,
excessive slopes, fault hazard areas, resource quantities, and so on— has
“17“
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resulted, and will continue to result, in enormous social and private costs.
Our neglect to consider, and be obligated by, the claims of future genera­
tions demonstrates an unwillingness to guide the creation of a viable future, 
a willingness to gamble away the best interests of our children and of theirs. 
The discouraging ineffectiveness of citizen participation threatens an 
"eclipse of citizenship"^^ and helps insure that most people will "flee to 
the reassurance of day-to-day life with its unchanging, pressing demands, 
an unfortunate and-unnecessary loss of public talent and needed perspective. 
Last, a decision-making arena with excessive discretion and a crisis-by-crisis 
approach will produce inconsistent decisions that are unmindful of duties to 
future generations and the imperative of ecological viability.
In a recent book on environmental administration, Lynton Keith Caldwell
argued that humans must reappraise conventional behavior and "must revise 
institutional arrangements to enable humsui society ±o guide [its] behavior,
collectively and individually, in ways conducive to the protection and
restoration of..-planetary life-support systems.(Emphasis added) But
he admits the difficulty of prescribing specific reforms:
Clearly the wisest among us presently seem unable 
to set down in detail the things that must be done to 
attain a self-renewing world providing for humanity’s 
material and aesthetic n e e d s . . . .^3
Despite this ominous warning, it will not suffice to ignore the prospects
for essential changes in our political/legal approach to environmental quality.
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PART II
THE PUBLIC TRUST APPROACH; 
AH UMBRELLA FRAMEWORK
Introduction
As presently administered, but vith significant exceptions and 
tendencies discussed below, the law does not allow the pursuit of 
environmental protection as a long-range goal of high public priority.
The old civil remedies of nuisance,negligence,and trespass, 
although expandable to be used in some environmental controversies, are 
not well-suited for consistent environmental protection and as a means of 
developing positive environmental policy. Nuisance, negligence, and 
trespass are essentially after-the-fact, private remedies for specific, 
case-by-case legal wrongs committed against present parties. They do 
not and cannot provide anticipatory and comprehensive protection for the 
environment or for future generations.
What is needed is the clear legal recognition that environmental 
quality is a matter of paramount legal importance and that we must have 
enforceable legal duties to protect it. Then, a set of institutions 
can be built by using and expanding upon the ample legal precedents 
available.
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Chapter 1 
General Outline of Trust Law
Consider the existing body of law established for the legal protection 
of important items. The item is placed in a special legal status; it is 
guarded by a discrete, clearly identified party; and it is managed for 
the benefit of another party, whose rights are enforceable at law. This 
body of law is trust law.
In the legal sense, a trust has several basic features:
1. A legally protected item— the "corpus” of the TRUST;
2. A party charged with strenuous obligations to protect 
the trust— the TRUSTEE; and
3. A party (or parties) for whose benefit the trust is managed 
and who can enforce proper management of the trust— the 
BENEFICIARY.
Trust law has grown enormously in the past century. Although there 
are a number of types of trust, the basic concept is quite simple.
Any identifiable real or personal property— or future interests 
therein— can be placed in trust. Basically, placing property in trust 
amounts to reposing in someone an enforceable confidence.^® A trust is 
distinguishable from numerous other legal relationships, such as agencies, 
annuities, bailments, contracts, or mortgages.The main difference is
- 20-
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that a trust nearly always involves a distinction between legal ownership 
(vested with the trustee) and equitable interest (vested with the 
beneficiary). The basic structure of a trust is quite flexible and the 
parties "...may, by their express or implied agreement, give it such 
meaning or place such a limitation on its meaning as they desire.
The trust, then, is a special status of legally enforceable confidence. 
This confidence is reposed in a party— the trustee who handles day-to-day 
management of the trust. •
The trustee usually has a possessory interest and has the right and 
duty to control and manage the t r u s t . T h e  basic duty of a typical trustee 
is "...to protect, conserve, and safeguard the assets of the trust for the 
benefit of all the [beneficiaries], and he is liable for a loss thereof 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care, prudence, and 
d il i g e n c e . T h e trustee must act wholly and at all times for the benefit 
of the trust and the beneficiary. He is both empowered and bound to perform 
all actions necessary, expedient, or incidental to protect the trust.53 
"He must take such action with respect to the trust property as will be most 
conducive to its welfare...."^^ It is expressly prohibited for a trustee 
to misappropriate or waste the trust, and he is liable for misappropriation 
of trust property, whether such misappropriation inures to his own benefit 
or someone else's.Restrictions are also placed on the trustee's ability 
to sell or otherwise convey the trust property.
Creating a trust requires that there be an identified beneficiary 
who can enforce the trustee's obligations.^^ The beneficiary need not be 
an individual— it can be a clearly defined c l a s s . N o r  is it mandatory 
that the beneficiary be immediately present. The unborn can be beneficiary,
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in vhich case a trust operating to the benefit of one not yet born , cannot 
be terminated until it is established that the likelihood of that person 
being born is negligible. The beneficiary is represented by an individual 
or group.
The legal «interest of the beneficiary (or representative) is a property 
right.Typically, the beneficiary does not have legal title to the trust, 
but possesses an enforceable equitable interest in the protection of the 
trust.
The trust framework briefly outlined above is particularly well-suited 
to environmental problems. Many aspects of enviromental quality, including 
clear air, pure water, and unsullied land, are clearly appropriate for 
trust status. Persons who control these aspects, or make decisions with 
respect to them, should be trustees— forced to consider and act hard upon 
the need for enviromental quality and the claims of future generations.
And, the public— or various segments of the public, including representatives 
of future generations— ought to be in a legal position to compel trust-like 
management of Important resources.
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■ Chapter 2
History of the Public Trust
The very flexibility of trust law has led jurists to call it "the 
most amazing part of Anglo-American law."^^ Courts have noted its 
expansive character: "...[the] trust device has been used for many
different business purposes in recent years, and we are certain that 
astute attorneys will discover new uses for the trust in the future...."  ̂
This generally acknowledged flexibility in trust law is not the only 
argument for the application of trust principles to environmental matters. 
There is a branch of trust law— the roots of which are older than trust 
law itself— that has been used for centuries in various resource disputes. 
This is the public trust. As will be seen, it could be expanded to provide 
an umbrella framework for the pursuit of environmental quality.
A. Roots of the Public Trust
In Roman and early English law, much attention was focused on public
access rights to cei'tain common properties— seashores, highways, and
flowing waters.Roman jurisprudence held it to be basic natural law
that "air, running water, the sea, and the seashore" were common to all:
No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, 
provided he abstains from injury to [improvements]....
[a]11 rivers and harbours are public, so that all 
persons have a right to fish therein...everyone is 
entitled to bring his vessel to the bank [of a river], 
and fasten cables to the trees growing there and use 
it as a resting place for the cargo, as freely as he 
may navigate the river itself.
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With the ascendancy of the English kings, these public rights were 
nearly extinguished. Access to what was previously considered common 
property became virtually a matter of royal prerogative.^®
In general, the subjects later treated in Magna Charta— a 
reaction to various royal abuses— ^herald the reascendancy of public 
concerns over private (or royal) practices. For example, iT> the early 
13th century, navigation was being hampered by large fishing structures 
permanently fixed to the bottom of rivers. A chapter of Magna Charta 
expressly outlawed the practice.
In the late 19th century, the public trust was explicitly incorporated 
into American law. One of the earliest examples is cited in an I889 
Hew Hampshire case where it was stated that although the king previously 
held title to all land, he did so "as trustee in his official and repre­
sentative capacity, with no private i n t e r e s t T h e  seashore, arms of 
the sea, and large ponds "...could not be converted into private estates 
or subject to a private easement by the trustee's [king's] grant, or by 
any act of the executive branch of the government.
Of course, by I889, the United States government had acquired all the
king's holdings and was undertaking numerous schemes to produce revenue
72by disposing of the lands. But the principle of the public trust remained 
alive in American law.
In 1889, the federal government sued to void deeds that had fraudulently
granted public lands. Althou^ the deeds were upheld on equitable grounds,
the court stated:
The public domain is held by the government as 
part of its trust. The Government is charged 
with the power to protect it from trespass and 
•unlawful appropriation T3 (Emphasis added)
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In a later case, when the Department of the Interior failed to recover 
property incorrectly surveyed, the court held that the Secretary of the 
Interior was "guardian of the people of the United States over the public 
land" and that, considerng this, public land should not be wasted or 
granted illegally.
In 1897, the court endorsed a governmental effort to force removal of 
fences placed on the open range,holding that the fences would violate 
the government's "...duties as a trustee for the people of the United States 
to permit any individual or private corporation to monopolize [public 
lands] for private gain.. . When governmental limitations on public 
domain mining claims were challenged, the Supreme Court ruled the limita­
tions a valid regulation of the land held in trust for the people.
The leading public trust decision in American law occurred in a case 
in which property had passed from governmental to private ownership. In 
1869» the Illinois state legislature gave one mile of Chicago waterfront 
and one square mile of Lake Michigan's bed to the Illinois Central Railroad. 
Four years later, official sentiment had changed and the state sued to 
void the grant.
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the grant using a public trust 
rationale: "There can be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of
property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust..." Strong language 
indeed. The court ruled thus because the property in question was held 
by the state "for purposes in which the whole people are interested.
The court went on to announce some fundamental principles of public trust 
law:
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It is only by observing the distinction between a 
grant of.. -parcels for the improvement of the public 
interest, or which when occupied do not substantially 
impair the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining, and a grant of the whole property in which 
the public is interested, that the language of the 
adjudged cases can be reconciled.... The State can 
no more abdicate its trust over property in which the 
whole people are interested...than it can abdicate 
its police powers in the administration of government 
and the preservation of the peace.®® (Emphasis added)
B. Erosion of the Public Trust
In 1905, the federal government sought to enjoin illegal grazing on
0*1
reserved national forest lands. The court, no longer speaking of solemn 
public duties, showed a reluctance to curb Congressional discretion in 
administering the trust. To be sure, the court held that "All the public 
lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole
82country....'* Unfortunately for the development of public trust law, 
the Supreme Court then equated public trust powers and duties with the
Oo
largely discretionary rights of proprietorship. From that point on, the 
Supreme Court was to treat governmental powers as nearly identical to the 
rights of a proprietor. -
This simplified theory— a discretionary understanding of property 
rights rooted in the writings of theorists such as John Locke and in the 
practices of frontier settlement— has dominated the development of American 
property law and stifled the potential of the public t r u s t . T h e  trust 
concept has remained primarily an undercurrent.
Generally, it is established that fee simple ownership of prop-Tty 
gives a proprietor the ri^ts of possession, use, enjoyment, dominion, and 
disposition and that these rights are protected by law.®^ Popularly, it 
is assumed that the proprietor is free to do whatever he wishes with his
property, provided an immediate neighbor is not directly injured.
- 26“
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Legally, property rights are not absolute, particularly where the 
rights of others— even distant others— are infringed.However, the 
rights of future generations, the right to be free from social costs 
(externalities) and option attrition caused by private or corporate 
development practices, and rights that are damaged through the impairment 
of complex ecological processes over long periods of time are not 
vigorously or consistently protected.
C. Inadequacies of Property Rights Concept
Our simplistic understanding of property rights has produced substantial 
confusions and difficulties. A more refined appreciation of ecological 
processes— and the ways in which they are influenced by actions beyond the 
property fenceline— renders our system of property rights obsolete.
87To be sure, property is an important and complex notion. A persistent 
theme throughout political and legal philosophy has been that property 
ownership is important for the security and base of operation it provides.
Also, it is thought that the protection of some kinds of property, by due
88process and the takings clause, is an important check on governmental power.
True, the popularly assumed ’’absoluteness” of property rights is under 
attack. The ’’takeover” of those rights by an increasingly proprietary 
government, has been noted and decried: ”If property has eroded as an
alternative to governmental power and we are all dependent upon the government’s 
largesse, then freedom itself is in jeopardy.
In important part, however, this erosion is due to an ecologically 
ignorant notion of property rights. It appears likely that the erosion 
will continue unless a new structure of property rights, based on clearly
- 27 -
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
defined environmental rights and responsibilities, is developed.Only 
such a structure will restore property to its earlier status— a set of 
legitimate possessions that provide security, a base of operations, and 
a hedge against governmental abuses.
Establishing an environmentally consonant notion of property could 
create friction with those committed to the "free good" character of 
property. However, for all its import and current peril, property should 
not be an impenetrable facade behind which environmental quality and the 
viability of the future are routinely degraded or destroyed. Hor should 
the public be forced to track down environmental abuses after the fact and 
then seek to have them remedied. We have developed a reasonable and promising 
understanding of the natural and social environments— enough to require that 
ecological and social impacts be considered in a comprehensive, systematic 
way before major decisions are made. To do so, we must expand the public 
trust so that it applies to all important aspects of a quality environment.
D. Need for an Expanded Public Trust
Joseph Sax noted in his ground-breaking treatment of the public trust
that although
...the historical scope of public trust law is quite 
narrow...it is clear that the judicial techniques 
developed in public trust cases need not be limited
either to these few coventional interests or to
questions of disposition of public properties.
Public trust problems are found wherever governmental
regulation comes into question.  Certainly the
principle of the public trust is broader than its 
traditional application indicates....91
But how can an old doctrine whose primary coverage extended to seashores, 
tidelands, submerged lands, and highways be called upon as a comprehensive 
spur for environmental quality? The answer can be outlined as follows:
- 28-
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1. The public interest protected during the historical development
of the trust doctrine (primarily commercial access to certain properties)
has been joined by a number of other competing and equally legitimate
public interests, primary among which is environmental quality. The
natural features previously protected— seashores, arms of the sea, ponds—
were obviously discernible to the eye and were valued for their economic
uses, not their more subtle ecological functions. Now, however, a wide
range of ecological processes and qualities is equally essential and
godistinguishable. .These could be placed in trust status.^
2. Conventional property ownership ignores the numerous ecological 
processes and events that occur irrespective of property boundaries.
The trust doctrine offers the opportunity to separate property into 
ecological constituents as opposed to the present approach of simply 
dividing property at the fence line. This would allow development of a 
clear, enforceable, ecologically based set of responsibilities.
3. The trust doctrine was formed in part as an effort to restrain 
royal prerogative (e.g., the king's denying access to the land or 
randomly appropriating animals or other property). Ne currently face a 
similar problem in the exercise of administrative discretion by public 
and private authorities. Establishing the trust would empower a 
beneficiary to guard the trust, no matter who owns or controls it, and 
compel its protection.
To recapitulate before proceeding with a more detailed examination
of the expanded public trust: The concept, as rooted in Roman, English,
and American law, generally protects important public values by
restricting private and/or governmental discretion. It places items of
importance in trust. It imposes a clear and unavoidable duty on the
-29-
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trustee to manage the trust to the advantage of a specific beneficiary. 
Expansion of the trust concept could help resolve difficulties emanating 
from our overly simplistic notion of property rights and could provide 
the framework for a more legitimate, defensible notion of property and a 
more effective pursuit of environmental quality. Expansion of the concept 
could also redirect the attention of citizens, judges, and legislators 
toward shaping the law to the environment instead of— as under the present 
system— the reverse.
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Chapter 3 
Expanding the Public Trust Approach
Generally speaking, expanding the public trust approach would 
involve recognition of a trust to he protected, a trustee to handle 
day-to-day management, and a beneficiary to receive the benefits (or 
see that they accrue) and enforce the trustee's duties,
A. Structuring Public Trusts
Most of the literature on the public trust doctrine focuses on 
the rights it creates for beneficiaries, or on the new powers it would 
create for the Judicial branch of government.93 The actual struc­
ture and components of the trust have received scant attention.
The trusts should include the entire body of resources and 
interests worthy of protection. A wide variety of ecological attri­
butes could be included in public trusts. Of course, air, water, 
and public lands are the most obvious choices for trust protection, 
since they have been treated in a trust-like fashion by the law for some 
time in numerous jurisdictions. Other resources and ecological 
processes (and the options of future generations) should also be included 
not without some difficulty, to be sure.
For example, fish and wildlife are legally considered to be beyond 
private ownership. Neither respects the conventional property 
boundaries between private landowners, counties, states, or nations.
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They are an important part of the ecological web, depending for their 
continued existence on ecological processes that likewise ignore 
conventional property lines.
Some other trustable resources and attributes include:
minerals (both claimable and leaseable) such as coal, 
oil, gas;
soil quantity (particularly in highly erosive areas);
basic productivity of soil on important agricultural 
and silvicultural lands;
important nutrient cycles; and,
natural energy flows.
The list is bounded only by the limits of growing ecological 
insight and is conditioned by the practical needs of humanity in 
its efforts to make a home on earth.
Once a resource or area is placed in trust, its primary 
constraints and values, which could well vary widely from place to 
place, must be identified. The purpose and value of the trust corpus 
must be clarified as an enforceable guide to the trustee. Nondis- 
cretionary duties must be identified and imposed upon the trustee.
Creating a trust would not require placing an expanse of land 
or the particular environmental attribute in governmental ownership. 
Title, if it exists, would not necessarily change. As detailed in 
the Private Agreements section below, an easement approach could 
serve quite well. For example, "conservation” or "scenic" ease­
ments are a common practice. Certain development options are fore­
gone by property owner(generally in exchange for money and reduced 
property or inheritance taxes). The easement recognizes the 
"bundle-of-rights" nature of landed property and allows the transfer 
of specified parts of the bundle. -32-
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Actions to place ecological attributes in trust status would not 
necessarily require compensation under the "taking" clause of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Chapter 6, "Is the Public Trust Approach 
Constitutional?") Protecting lands and waters from pesticide applica­
tion, prohibiting practices that erode soils, and even guarding the 
aesthetic environment have been held to be valid exercises of the police 
power. A valid exercise of the police power does not require compensa­
tion in most cases.
B. Selection and Duties of the Trustee
After a resource (e.g., mineral) or ecosystem attribute (e.g., 
groundwater quality) is placed in trust, the question arises: "Who
will manage the trust as trustee?" The answer to this question will 
depend on the resource to be placed in trust. The trustee could range 
from a private landowner to an agency of the federal government; and, 
in some cases, an international trustee will be most appropriate.
For example, private landowners make numerous land use decisions 
with only minimal governmental involvement : fencing, roading, building
construction (except for the requirement for building permits), irriga­
tion ditches, technological and equipment choices, and so on. Local 
governments typically handle zoning changes and master plans. State 
governments regulate water appropriations, mining reclamation, major 
energy facilities, sewage disposal utility rates, and so on.
Regional governments are virtually nonexistent, except for advisory 
purposes and an uncertain amount of policy formation.
The federal government sets national policies and requires state 
implementation plans for air and water quality, sets radiation standards,
and performs numerous other functions.
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All this makes for a hodge-podge of private and governmental efforts, 
with private parties struggling to make a living while meeting or 
circumventing existing environmental requirements.
Selecting trustees —  or co-trustees to share clearly specified 
duties —  will at least help clarify the entity who has the primary 
obligation to manage a given resource.
1. ]Authority Levels[
Choosing the appropriate trustee for each of a variety of resources, 
eco-system attributes, or individual areas will not be easy. Some 
critical theoretical antinomies must be resolved. For example, there is 
a continual and heated debate over the appropriate place for the making 
of environmental decisions. Simply heaping more duties on the federal 
government will not solve the problem; nor will it do in all cases simply 
to give authority to the local level. There is a justified suspicion 
that advocates of "local control" in land use decisions often really mean 
"no control." In addition, trustees could often find themselves in 
conflict —  e.g., when clearing noxious weeds from rights of way, does 
one burn the vegetation (air pollution) or spray it with herbicides 
(wildlife or water quality impairment)?
The selection of a trustee amounts to the choice of a decision­
maker and raises hard questions about the necessary exercise of decision­
making power and the essential restraints on that power.
No doubt, numerous decisions will have to be made at the local 
level for practical reasons or because they have important community 
impacts.
Recent debates on national l a n d  use policy have focused attention
on the need for other land use decii sion-making levels in specific
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c a s e s . Some land use decisions have far-reaching effects heyond the 
local community.The siting of "key developments" such as major 
commercial centers, energy conversion plants, and others have impacts 
on county, state and even regional services, economic patterns, and environ­
mental processes.
Furthermore, there are areas (and ecological processes) of greater 
than local c o n c e r n . I n  the federal legislation, these are termed 
"areas of critical state concern" or "critical areas" to indicate their 
extra-local importance: prime agricultural land, areas of significant
natural hazard, key vildlife hahitat, critical wetlands, lakeshores, 
fragile and erodable soil patterns, important historical or archaeological 
sites, and others.
The above suggests a difficult and controversial period of mixing 
centralization and decentralization.^^ A blind commitment to one or 
the other will not serve.
An overly centralized environmental decision-making structure can 
pose a number of. problems, as western states are fast discovering in 
the face of the federal government's efforts to "move western coal."^® 
Beyond that, it can stifle the vigor of genuine local communities and 
can destroy the political capabilities of local citizens, who are then 
left to their compelling but incomplete private lives —  lives managed 
by distant and invisible bureaucracies.
Avoiding an overly localized decision-making structure will be just 
as difficult, however. Strong local development interests have often 
been attacked for pushing short-term developments irrespective of their 
longer-term public consequences.
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2. iThe Analogy of Civil Liberties[
In selecting the appropriate levels for environmental trusteeship, 
the analogy between protecting environmental quality and protecting 
civil liberties should be explored.
The exercise or protection of civil liberties often appears 
troublesome and contentious to localities. Free speech, assembly, or 
petition; the proper use of warrants in searches and seizures; the pain­
staking guarantees of due process and fair trial; the presumption of 
innocence —  all these, at one time or another, have strained the poli­
tical capabilities of local communities and states.
Environmental quality decisions share many of the more controversial 
aspects of civil liberties protection. They often appear to be made for 
complex and distant reasons. They are sometimes contrary to immediate 
or apparent local economic goals and commercial practices. They may 
not seem to yield tangible benefits to local residents. Even if they 
might yield such benefits, local residents* suspicions are often not 
allayed— witness, for example, the refusal of mothers in El Paso to 
permit testing of their children for unsafe concentrations of lead from 
the local smelter.
Localities have other problems. Corruption is always a possibility 
in local environmental decision-making; but corruption can occur at all 
levels of government and corporate management.
Beyond corruption, there is a social closeness at the local level 
that can preclude effective regulation where such regulation is called 
for. For example, it is difficult for a community leader to nix a variance 
request from an acquaintance or "old friend." This is not necessarily 
a matter of interest conflict, since the two may have no overlapping 
business pursuits.
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In a word, local communities may "be too near the warmth (not the 
heat) to make effective environmental decisions in certain cases. A 
flexibly federated environmental decision-making system must take this 
into consideration.
3. ISome Guidelines on Defining Trust Duties!
It must not be forgotten that the duties assigned to a trustee will 
be at least as important as choosing the trustee. These duties are 
discussed in more detail below. Generally speaking, trusteeship is not 
a new notion in Anglo-American law. Private trusts are ancient and, as 
mentioned previously, public trusts also have deep historical roots.
In the course of developing trust and resource law. Judges and legal 
scholars have explored trusteeship and similar notions in some detail.
The notion of trusteeship conçares favorably with Aldo Leopold's 
idea of stewardship, recognizing that ecosystems are extremely complex 
and that the present landowner is a transient visitor on e a r t h . A n d  
trusteeship has been written into a number of federal and state sta­
tutes and state constitutions, even though implementation has not been 
accomplished. In part, this is because the trustee notion is typically 
drafted as policy language, very seldom embellished with specific duties 
or operative provisions.
A couple of strains in early water law approximate the approach 
that could be applied, with appropriate modification, to the trusting 
of land as well. First, the rights acquired when one appropriates 
water are use rights only.^®^ They are not fee simple ownership rights.
Second, in riparian water law there was an old, if generally 
ignored, maxim that an upstream user could not diminish the quality or
quantity of a downstream riparian's water.
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These and other aspects of trusteeship are discussed in Chapter U.
C. Selection and Rights of the Beneficiary
One important ambiguity in the public trust theory in 
the United States revolves around the question of "Trust 
for Whom?" Is it for the general public, would-be users of 
the land, state citizens, or all nationals
One of the most important and complex problems in expanding the 
public trust doctrine is selecting and granting rights to a beneficiary 
who is in a position to enforce the trust. In English law, local use 
of resources was sometimes protected, but the trust itself was considered 
to be national in s c o p e . A  national beneficiary was presumed to 
exist. The U.S. Supreme Court, in the Illinois Central case, held that 
the lakeshore lands were to be held in trust for the people of the 
state.^^5 In short,,in selecting a beneficiary', no pat answer can be 
given. Each resource must be considered separately. Expansion of 
the trust doctrine could require a variety of beneficiaries: special,
local, state, regional, national, and international interests, as well 
as representatives of environmental and future interests.
For example, in the case of mining on or near prime agricultural 
lands, local landowners (farmers and ranchers) could be among the 
beneficiaries and could receive protection for their agricultural opera­
tions from the adverse impacts of surface or underground mining. This 
is a particularly acute problem in the West where mineral, and specifically 
coal, ownership has been severed from surface ownership. The rancher 
may not own the coal, gas, oil, or other minerals underlying the ranch —  
even though his predecessors homesteaded the land with a strictly agri­
cultural intent. Alternatively, he may depend upon sub-surface ecological
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processes on adjacent mineralized lands for groundwater. Mining in or 
near an aquifer (water "bearing stratum) could affect the pattern, quantity, 
or quality of necessary groundwater flows. If designated beneficiary, 
the landowner would be able directly to protect the groundwater flows 
necessary for agricultural productivity. The landowner probably could 
not be expected to monitor concerns that go beyond his interests. For 
instance, a broader beneficiary would be necessary to represent the 
public concerns with respect to surface mining on or adjacent to prime 
agricultural lands.
With recognition of their widespread ecological importance, critical 
groundwater patterns could be mapped comprehensively and placed in trust.
An appropriate level of government, probably state or federal, could act 
in cooperation with private landowners as trustee —  monitoring the ground­
water situation and protecting the interests of involved landowners, 
environmental groups, and future generations as beneficiaries.
Generally, the beneficiary should be selected with a view to the 
practical problems of enforcement as well as the range of interests to 
be protected. A beneficiary with an insufficiently broad concern will 
not be adequate to the task. Also, a beneficiary who lacks basic knowledge 
of environmental impacts may not be effective. The beneficiaries* 
rights in enforcing the trust must be carefully spelled out so there is 
no doubt when and how enforcement proceedings may be undertaken. These 
powers must include ready access to administrative proceedings and judi­
cial remedies, including injunctions (to stop ill-advised action) and 
mandamus (to compel beneficial action).
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The powers of the beneficiary— and the fact that the beneficiary 
may be a fairly diffuse class of individuals— could well necessitate a 
new set of administrative procedures and a new role for the courts.
D. Conclusion
Environmentalists over the past few years have generally attempted 
to expand the regulatory authority of governmental agencies to increase 
public control over private and corporate activities. Although this 
approach has had its benefits, the history of the regulatory agencies has 
generally not shown much p r o m i s e . I t  has become clear that the supposed 
regulator comes to share the interests of the regulated. A 
massive, uncontrollable, and not entirely relevant bureaucracy re­
sults in . widespread disenchantment with reliance on public authorities 
for anything, let alone the pursuit of environmental quality. On the 
other hand, it has been established that the third branch of government 
the courts —  could have an important role in environmental decisions
The public trust approach promises a more effective, less bureaucratic 
expansion of the public ' s role in resource decisions for two reasons :
(l) a clearly defined beneficiary would be granted legal rights to .enforce 
proper handling of the trust; and (2) the trust could encompass various 
aspects of the environment in a way that follows ecological processes —  
not conventional practices. At the same time, the trust approach pro­
mises to provide more ecologically appropriate rights, responsibilities, 
and decision-making.
The following sections describe in greater detail how a public
trust approach would operate for a variety of resources and outlines
methods for implementing the trust concept.
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Chapter
Application of Expanded Public Trust Law
Throu^out this discussion of specific resources, it is important 
to keep in mind that the point of the public trust approach is to 
structure an adversary, obligatory relationship which will enable the 
public to act decisively to protect the environment: (l) Key elements
of environmental systems must be considered the corpus of public trusts 
and must be given a protected legal status; (2) The party responsible 
for management of the trust corpus must have his obligations clearly 
identified to prevent serious or irreparable loss of the trust; and 
(3) Those obligations must be enforceable by identified beneficiaries 
or appropriate representatives. The trust doctrine, as with any legal 
means to protect the environment, will not spring full-blown from the 
dust of a law library. It will need patient development and careful 
implementation.
Many resources, from public lands to the soil productivity of private 
lands, must be considered for trust status. In each case, this paper 
sketches the rationale for placing the resource in trust; the parties 
who might best manage the trust; and the parties who should be able to 
enforce the trust as beneficiaries— proceeding from the easier to the 
more difficult.
A. public Lands
It has been judicially determined that federal lands are currently 
held in trust for all the p e o p l e . U n d e r  the U.S. Constitution,
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Congress exercises supreme control over these lands: "The Congress
shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations 
respecting the territory or property belonging to the IMited States..
This constitutional provision has been construed to mean that the power 
of Congress with respect to federal lands is virtually unlimited.
Merely having authority is not enough, however. The question remains: 
What are the duties of Congress with respect to the public lands? The 
courts have not been very clear on this point. They have chosen to 
denominate Congress as trustee of the public lands. "All the public 
lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole 
country.. That is a statement which implies that public lands are a
public trust, that Congress is the trustee, and that the public is bene­
ficiary. However, in the same case, in the same paragraph, the court 
backed away from the trust framework and argued that "it is not for the 
courts to say how that trust shall be a d m i n i s t e r e d . I n  fact, the court 
went on to confuse the obligatory trust relationship with the discre- 
tionsury powers of an ordinary proprietor.
According to one commentator, this decision "...represented for all 
practical purposes the end of the federal court's use of the public 
trust doctrine in conjunction with restraining unauthorized private use 
of public l a n d s . "^^5 (Emphasis added) The court virtually extinguished 
the rights of the public as beneficiary to enforce the protection of 
the trust. The beneficiary was left primarily with the inadequate 
recourse of lobbying in Congress or challenging agency action under dis­
cretionary statutes.
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The cases on this point read as if the courts chose the intellectually 
appealing trust notion vithout quite understanding it. Consequently, 
the main duties involved in the management of the public lands are those 
imposed by Congress on the executive agencies; and, in the case of public 
lands. Congress more often gives discretion rather than duties. The 
court's role in construing these duties is unduly limited to recognition 
of the whims of Congress.
With the long history of fraud, error, and persistent abuse of the 
federal lands, this largely discretionary management situation has become 
intolerable.It is not beneficial to the public at large, to future 
generations, or to the numerous parties who depend on the federal lands 
for private economic gain— e.g., farmers and ranchers who lease blocks 
of federal acreage as an essential part of their operations.
Federal lands should be placed in a genuine trust status.
Either throu^ case law, statute, or constitutional amendment it 
must be made clear that the federal government is not only en^owered but 
is affirmatively required to manage the public lands as a public trust.
The federal government in all its branches should be clearly identified 
as trustee of the lands. Specific duties to manage public lands with 
respect for their environmental limitations and the options of future 
generations should be imposed. The trustee should be required to avoid 
reasonably expected environmental risks save on proof of national socio­
economic necessity and the absence of a feasible and prudent alternative.^^?
In general, the public at large should be designated the beneficiary
of public lands. At minimum, the growing list of groups and individuals
concerned and knowledgeable about the proper management of public lands,
those concerned and knowledgeable about the viability of future generations—
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not simply those who depend on the federal land base for their liveli­
hood— should be constituted beneficiaries of the trust. Those who can show 
an "unflagging dedication" to the proper management of public lands and 
the claims of future generations should have no artificial limits placed 
on their ability to proceed into court to defend the public trust.
This approach would have numerous salutary effects. For example, 
agency personnel would be clearly put on notice that the management of 
public lands is not simply a discretionary career with a pension waiting 
at the end. Congress would be prodded to review management failures on the 
public lands, particularly since the courts would no longer simply defer 
to Congressional fiat as if it were gospel. . ■
B. Surface Water
Presently, there are two primary systems of law on water usage: 
the riparian doctrine and the appropriation doctrine.
The riparian doctrine is commonly used in the eastern United States. 
Under the doctrine, a person who owns land adjacent to a watercourse is 
entitled, subject to a variety of standards, to a qualified, reasonable 
use of the water.^^9 The doctrine is typically found associated with 
abundant water a r e a s . 120 Generally, the water has to be used on the land 
adjacent to the water and cannot be sold for use on other land.121 
As the western frontier was being opened, the pattern of social 
and economic development forced a new approach in the law of water use. 
Water was a good deal less abundant in the West and the settlers couldn't 
all crowd in adjacent to the water. Both agricultural and mineral 
development involved the physical removal of substantial quantities of 
water from the watercourse, thus creating the appropriation doctrine.
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In 1866, and again in I8TT, Congress recognized a need for water 
on non-riparian l a n d s . 1^2 Gradually, it became commonplace in the West 
to allow parties to appropriate or divert water for "beneficial" uses 
considerable distances from the stream. The term "beneficial use" was 
construed to include nearly any conventional use: municipal, domestic, 
commercial, or industrial. The guiding principle in the law was that 
the first in time was first in right; that is, the party that first 
appropriated water for a beneficial use obtained a priority ri^t, 
enforceable against others who might want to use the water.^23
This "completely utilitarian" approach to water led to a host of 
abuses.Streams ran dry or filings were made several times in excess 
of historical flows. In low-flow years, a latecomer could legally be 
dried out. The idea that a minimum flow should be left for the viability 
of the stream or for recreational use was unheard of.
Over the years, both the riparian and appropriation doctrines have 
undergone substantial modification by the courts and legislatures 
nevertheless the basic disregard for the environmental or long-term 
socio-economic effects of water use remains. In consequence, water- 
right s law at present is dangerously disorganized and many of the early 
abuses still obtain.
Water and its associated aquatic habitats are too important to be 
left to the narrowness of strictly commercial doctrines. Important 
surface water resources— especially those with significant recreational 
values, those whose current flow levels are marginal with respect to habi­
tat values, those that are important for the support of marine-based 
enterprises, and those over which there is likely to be pitched competi­
tion for limited supplies— should be placed in trust.
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Typically, there has been no managing authority to supervise the 
appropriation of water. In most states, a filing with the county or a 
state agency is all that is required. In fact, some states* common law 
provides that rights acquired only by use of the water are valid.
And it is the state district court that is often called upon to resolve 
disputes. Thus, there is very little clear precedent to aid in selec­
tion of a trustee.
Choosing an overly localized trustee in such a controversial area 
as water rights is probably tantamount to selecting no trustee at all.
It would be easier in the short run to ignore the complexities of over- 
appropriated streams and the cross-claims of competing users; however, 
to do so would simply push some very serious water problems off to another 
day.
Realistically, the trustee for surface water would probably have 
to be a combination of state and regional officials. Compiling data 
on actual present uses of water is an expensive and complex process. 
Projecting future needs and uses is equally complicated. Both tasks 
could easily outrun the budgetary and staff limitations of local govern­
ments. However, when planning for future uses occurs, the local users—  
along with other interests— should be well-represented.
The beneficiary of surface water resources, given their elemental 
importance, should always be the public at large. From a pollution point 
of view, the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments recog­
nize this breadth of interest by establishing a broad set of participation 
procedures and by allowing all citizens to enforce the act
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C. Groundwater
Groundwater is a largely unseen but critical resource. Legally 
speaking, it is typically divided into two classes: underground streams
which flow in known channels, and seeping or percolating waters.
The distinction is important since the law of underground streams is 
basically the same as that applicable to surface w a t e r s . U n d e r  this 
body of law, a surface owner cannot waste, destroy, or pollute the ground­
water.
However, where the groundwater is of a seeping or percolating 
character— and its actual flow pattern can not be clearly described—  
it can be construed under present law as the personal property of the 
l a n d o w n e r  .^30 iphis permits a maverick approach to the use of ground­
water, an approach only beginning to be modified.
Groundwater shares the fundamental public importance of surface 
water and should be treated in a similar fashion. Important ground­
water sites— whether subterranean streams or seeps— should be placed in 
trust and handled as surface water.
D. Air
The earth's atmospheric envelope is now recognized as a fragile, 
intricate, and necessary part of the life-support system. Its use as 
a receptacle for contaminants is being regulated under federal and state 
laws.
Under the old common law, a landowner's ownership extended from the 
center of the earth to the infinity of space. But the demands of commerce- 
and the behavior of the air itself— did not respect these imaginary
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boundaries. It became increasingly obvious that the air has no particular 
address. Accordingly, over the years, the old notion has been modified, 
until, in I9U6, the U.S. Supreme Court held that absolute ownership of 
air space by private persons "has no place in the modern w o r l d .  "^32 
Since the public importance of air and air quality has already 
been legally established, extending the trust doctrine to .cover atmos­
pheric resources is relatively straightforward. Since it is very diffi­
cult to categorize air because of its physical behavior, all air would 
have to be placed in trust. Given recent findings, this should include a 
special category for indoor air as well.
Selection of a trustee could correspond to the present institutional 
framework of the Clean Air Act.^33 The federal government now sets 
minimum standards and the states are primarily responsible for implemen­
tation. Thus, state and federal levels could act as joint trustees. 
Stricter trustee obligations— such as non-degradation requirements—  
will need to be imposed for those areas which, for topographic or climatic 
reasons, are particularly susceptible to pollution build-up. The same is 
true for areas in which the air is quite cleain.
Again, the importance of using a trust approach would be to replace 
a discretionary institutional arrangement with one that is more clearly 
duty-laden. The beneficiary obviously would be the general public.
E. Energy Resources
Sources of energy also present a good public trust opportunity.
Most of the conventional energy sources— coal, oil, and natural gas— and 
such non-conventional sources as geothermal and uranium can be protected 
and developed under the public trust approach.
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Traditionally, energy resources have "been exploited on an ^  hoc, 
individualized basis. Large corporations and their major stockholders 
have been the primary beneficiaries. No detailed thought has been given 
until recently to future shortages, or optimum development rates.
In 1974, the first clear signs of coming scarcities were apparent 
on a wide scale with the Arab embargo and the oil crisis. Even in the 
midst of that crisis, however. Congress did not have and could not ob­
tain reliable data on the quantity or quality of available oil reserves. 
Neither was there adequate information on other energy sources.
Additionally, as documented in a recent study of western coal 
leasing, Congress and the federal agencies had abrogated control of a 
million acres of federal and Indian coal through a "badly flawed" 
leasing program.^35
Beyond the errors and omissions, energy has become the hole card—  
perhaps the end game— of foreign policy. This was indicated in terri­
fying starkness by the United States * polite refusal to inole out the use of 
nuclear weapons should foreign nations stop pumping crude our way.
Energy could well turn the U.S. and the western world into blundering 
brinksmen.
Energy resources today are obviously not treated as the body of a 
public trust. We unearth and consume them as if they were the sole 
property of this generation and there were no tommorrows. Governmental 
agencies are not sufficiently impressed with enforceable duties to pro­
tect and conserve energy resources. No one— aside from energy companies—  
has the information to establish, needed national energy policies, let 
alone the clear non-discretionary duties to protect the future's certain
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claims to these non-renewable resources. And no one seems willing to 
compel a more suitable approach.
In broad terms, the critical energy resources of this nation should 
be subject to the public trust— regardless of current ownership. It 
should be clearly stipulated that they are not the private profit pre­
serve of the energy monopolies or the present generation.
The trustee(s) should be charged with clear and legally-enforce- 
able duties including;
1. Assess the overall energy supply situation and maintain 
independent data on the reserves and useful life of 
various energy resources. Make realistic, publicly 
debatable projections on the likelihood of additional 
discoveries or technological advance.
2. Coordinate a strong effort to promote and, if necessary, 
mandate energy conservation and to reduce future 
difficulties in transitions from one resource to another.
Waste should be prohibited. Mandatory implementation 
plans for industrial conservation should be required. Resi­
dential utility rates for energy consumption should
be structured so as to provide the necessary amount of power 
for home use at a low rate; thereafter, energy should be 
expensively priced as an incentive to c o n s e r v e . ^36 uon- 
essential commercial uses (lifting the sky) can and 
should be banned.
3. Reduce wherever possible the adverse environmental impacts 
of energy exploration, extraction, transmission, and 
usage.
These and other duties should be enforced on a reasonable timetable 
by the public as beneficiary. Then we can at least begin to consider 
energy resources from a public perspective and in a duty-laden context.^3T
F. Minerals
Since the mid-l800s, public lands have been thrown open to routine 
mineral entry: prospecting, claiming, and development.^^® The
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anachronistic Mining Law of I872 and subsequent amendments seem to 
guarantee that private parties can enter public lands to explore for, 
take possession of, and extract minerals— a non-renewable resource.
While some incentive for mineral exploration might have been needed 
in the l800s, when a vast frontier seemed to promise unlimited resources 
and wealth, such an approach contains a decisive imbalance. The public 
has no corresponding rights for the protection of resources other than 
minerals found on public lands.
The practice of developing mineral resources simply in response to 
private or corporate marketing needs is another example of ignoring 
environmental— and as a result, economic— constraints, since these 
minerals cannot be replaced by man except by increasingly expensive 
substitution. Mining a given concentration of ore represents a one-time 
harvest of enormous public importance.
Again, like so many other resources, minerals have not been managed 
in a trust-like fashion. No formally designated trustee insures they 
are developed at a socially optimum rate, and no beneficiary is empowered 
to insure that public rights and the needs of the future count in deci­
sions to develop mineral resources. Encouraging random prospecting and 
accepting the subsequent private ownership,of minerals found on public 
lands is done today as if giant mining operations were ecologically 
harmless panhandlers; it removes any chance of accommodating proper mineral 
development and other national environmental or economic goals.
The best way to redress the current situation is to change all 
future mineral activity on the public lands to lease. In 1920, Congress 
woke up to the fact that oil and gas under federal lands were too valuable 
a resource to be exploited at random. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
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changed the system to make some minerals available only through competitive 
bid, perfected lease, and payment of royalties.Leasing shifted 
the final development decision to the federal government. Now, under 
the National Environmental Policy Act, mineral benefits can be weighed 
against environmental impacts and present and future economic needs.
Simply changing to a system of leasing for minerals is insufficient, 
however, without strict mineral conservation duties. And important 
deposits of minerals are also found underlying private lands— for example, 
the vast western holdings of the Union Pacific and Burlington Northern 
railroads.These resources constitute the nation's ticket to the 
future and should be placed in trust, thereby expressly prohibiting waste 
or diversion to uses inconsistent with the long-term public interest.
Owners of important minerals should be constituted as joint trustees to­
gether with the federal government. Cooperative development planning 
should be required. Known and probable reserve data should be compiled 
so that informed judgments about optimum development rates and locations 
can be made. Confidentiality provisions that close out public scrutiny 
should be repealed. The public, as beneficiary of a wise minerals 
policy, should be empowered to enforce conservation of our dwindling 
mineral resources.
G. Forest Ecosystems
There are numerous resources involved in forest ecosystems.^^3 
Placing emphasis on wildlife, watersheds, forage, recreation, timber, 
or mineral resources can lead to conflicts in management and development.
A vast amount (187,000,000 acres) of forest land is managed by the 
U.S. Forest Service under the Multiple Use and Sustained Yield Act of I^ÔO.I^^
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Theoretically, this law protects the many uses and resources of federal 
forest lands and insures that those lands will produce continuous crops 
of timber and support other forest-based activities.
Under the U.S. Constitution, as discussed above, Congress is 
supposedly trustee of these lands. However, the term "trustee" has been 
used rather loosely in court cases and has come to mean that there are 
insufficiently enforceable sustained yield duties imposed on the govern­
ment in managing forest l a n d s .^^5
The situation is much worse on the nation's privately held forest 
lands (about 70 percent of the nation's commercial forest lands). Some 
states have legislation (generally weak) regulating the use of these 
lands; and legislation has been attempted in the U.S. Congress.However, 
there is no general notion of trusteeship or stewardship consistently 
applied in the case of valuable private forest lands.
Applying the public trust doctrine would place important forest 
lands— whether public or private— in trust. In the case of private 
lands, the private landowner, perhaps in conjunction with a state-level 
resource agency, could be denominated trustee. His interests would be 
balanced by a publicly assertable right to prohibit harmful forest 
practices— those which exceed sustained yield, produce siltation or soil 
damage, or preclude reforestation.
The trustee would be required to practice sound forest management.
The actual dimensions of "sound management" could be determined by the 
landowner in conjunction with foresters at the state and federal level.
(At present, the private landowner can consult with state and federal 
foresters, but the landowner is not required to respect their advice or 
to consider the effects of his activities on the environment or economy.)
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Making management prescriptions for private lands routinely available 
to the public as beneficiary— together with progress reports on imple­
mentation— would be a long first step to providing the beneficiary with 
the data needed to assess whether the trust was being enforced.
Washington state’s Supreme Court has set an important precedent 
for forest resources. The court has used a balancing approach to prohibit 
what it terms ’’cut and run" timber harvest .1^7 At issue was a state law 
requiring the reforestation of timbered lands. Private landowners 
challenged the act on constitutional grounds. The court noted that 
improper timber harvest could cause flood damage, soil erosion, aesthetic 
impacts, and could undermine the economy of the state. The court held 
that the state can employ "reasonable means to safeguard the economic 
structure upon which the good of all depends.
In essence, the court held that a private landowner has a duty to 
provide for the restocking of forest lands— a duty to exercise sound 
management on timber lands. "Private enterprise must use its private 
property in ways not inconsistent with public welfare."1^9
Such duties are not extended or routinely enforced in many states 
or in the numerous other resource-related matters where the public good 
conflicts with private development proposals. Applying a public trust 
approach would clarify the rights and duties in this area.
H. Wildlife and Habitat
Species of wildlife are not known for their ability to read signs. 
They follow ecological patterns, not human conventions or conveniences. 
They forage routinely on public or private land without any apparent
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awareness of the difference or any sense of guilt over ’'trespass."
Partly because of our profit-oriented approach to land development and 
because of our ecologically insensitive ownership boundaries, substan­
tial acreages of wildlife habitat are continually destroyed in the United
States.150
Elk winter range, for example, is found on public and private 
property throughout the country. Winter range is often found at lower 
elevations— in the ripely developable foothills or lower meadows. Suppose 
a private developer buys a tract of land that is critical elk winter 
range and proposes to subdivide it for residential or commercial develop­
ment. He proposes to develop the land used by the elk for private profit. 
Is society precluded from regulating the developer’s use of that habitat? 
Does that private landowner have a right to subdivide the land and reap 
the maximum profits? If a governmental authority intervenes and prohibits 
the subdivision, must the state compensate the landowner for his lost 
profits?
Complicated questions indeed. Under present law, the matters would 
have to be litigated and the outcome would be difficult to predict. If 
critical wildlife habitat were placed in trust, and if the habitat areas 
proposed for subdivision were in the critical category, the answer to 
the three questions would probably be;
1. Society can properly act to protect the critical 
habitat of important wildlife species— whether 
located on public or private land.
2. There is no absolute right to maximize profits 
from a piece of land, especially if securing 
these profits would adversely affect important 
public values.
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3. A governmental authority or private entity should 
not have to buy all the important habitat in the 
country. Private landowners ought to have a sense 
of their own transience and a strong enough obliga­
tion to curtail publicly abusive activities without 
being paid to do so. Since there are uses of private 
property which are compatible with the protection of wild­
life habitat, the property would not have to be "taken" 
and hence compensation would not necessarily be r e q u i r e d .
Wildlife provides a good case for the discussion of these conqÿLexities. 
Building upon principles of Roman law, U.S. courts have held that wildlife 
species are not subject to private ownership and are "...owned by the 
state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all of its
people."^52
Since this common resource can be seriously impacted by individual 
activities, there should be a legal remedy where damage is about to 
occur. Currently, there is none. This is odd because we routinely 
regulate the hunting or taking of wildlife species. Poaching a moose, 
elk, or other big game animal is viewed as a serious and reprehensible 
offense. Substantial penalties are imposed. However, under current law, 
virtually anyone can develop land and pull essential habitat right out 
from under an entire elk herd. And no remedy exists.
The trustee of wildlife species has traditionally been the state 
wildlife a g e n c i e s . ^53 However, these agencies typically do not have the 
necessary control over the habitat that is essential to the survival of 
those species. This leads to numerous conflicts that no one is empowered 
to resolve.
Placing key wildlife species in trust would probably be futile 
unless habitat requirements, including wetlands, were also put in trust. 
Selecting an appropriate trustee to manage the resource would involve 
a decision as to which species should be managed at which levels of 
government.
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Beyond the trustee problem, it is important to give clear powers 
to a beneficiary who can adequately compel trust-like management of the 
trusted wildlife resource. Administrative and judicial remedies would 
have to be available. The national public should be the beneficiary 
for endangered and migratory species, if not for all wildlife.
I. Prime Agricultural Lands
With continuing malnutrition and starvation in many parts of the 
world (including the U.S.), and the somewhat selfish concern about the 
United States balance of payments, increased attention is being paid to 
the productivity of agricultural lands in the United States. The inces­
sant pressure for the subdivision or strip mining of agricultural land 
presents the opportunity for a coalition of interests between environ­
mentalist and agriculturalist. Whether such a coalition can emerge 
or not, the prime agricultural lands of the United States, which constitute 
a priceless, irreplaceable asset, must be managed with careful attention 
to environmental constraints and the food requirements of future genera­
tions. The exorbitant acreage prices of rural subdivision and the new­
found riches to be had in the sale of coal rights cannot be the primary 
guide for future agricultural policy. Instead, a careful inventory must 
be made of the food producing resources and capabilities of the United 
States. That inventory must be compared to the projected needs of the 
future— including a healthy risk increment to allow for adverse weather 
conditions, long-term climatic c h a n g e a n d  so on. The productive land 
needed by present and future generations must then become a ivublic trust.
Defining a trustee who can adequately protect thi:; critical resource 
poses a problem. In some respects, the actual landowner could probably
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serve. After all, in some sense, the small family farmer may have been 
the first conservationist.
However, this certainly was not always the case. The farmer has 
also been called the "quiet brihksman" and the "unseen foe in the war 
on pollution.Farmers have not been happy with erosion and sediment 
control programs, restrictions on the use of pesticides and herbicides, 
water pollution standards for non-point sources, scenic-river designa­
tions, and so on.
Perhaps a dual trustee would best solve the difficulty. The 
landowner would be responsible for the routine care of the agricultural 
resource of which he is the nominal, transient owner. However, to insure 
that a sound agricultural policy— not the vagaries of the rural land or 
coal markets— guides the development of agricultural resources, some 
level of government should have an oversight role.
Perhaps the general outlines of an agricultural protection policy 
could be developed from a federal perspective (to include programs 
encouraging smaller, energy-efficient operations and aiding young persons 
who do not have the financial means to enter agriculture). The state and 
local governments could then be required to adopt their own implementation 
plans to carry out the overall policy. (This is the approach utilized 
under both the federal Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act.)^56
The overriding priority must be to establish with some certainty 
that our difficult-to-renew agricultural base will remain intact and 
productive in the future. Structuring duties to require affirmative 
development of an enforceable agricultural policy is an important step.
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The beneficiaries in this case are the consumers of the various agricultural 
commodities and the public at large. They would need to be granted 
enforcement powers and consistent representation in disputes occasioned 
by the policy.
J. Conclusion
As our understanding of the environment continues to grow, any 
number of other aspects of the environment could become eligible for 
trust status. For example, continuing pressure for. weather modification 
and the potentially serious weather effects of coal-fired electricity 
plants could necessitate a trust-like approach for weather patterns.
Surface mining for coal and other land-disturbing activities could lead 
to placing the basic chemical structure and integrity of the soil in
trust.^57
The important point is that we must begin to assign clear 
environmental duties to clearly identified parties and we must provide 
sure enforcement mechanisms. The trust approach is a long step in this 
direction; for it penaits property to be divided along lines that make 
ecological sense— to the benefit of both the public goal of environmental 
quality and the notion of property. It also provides the opportunity to use 
the legal system to compel human recognition that there are ecological 
limitations to certain activities. And, through the compelling notion of 
"beneficiary," is generated the opportunity for future generations to be 
represented in present-day decisions.
Aldo Leopold wrote in the famous Sand County Almanac that "obligations 
have no meaning without conscience, and the problem we face is the exten­
sion of the social conscience from people to land."^58 ^his is one of 
the very few instances in which Leopold was wrong— or, at least, only
partially right. Actually, the proposition should almost be reversed:
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conscience without firm, clear obligation— for all its beauty and 
impressiveness— is an exceedingly tenuous affair, particularly in cases 
involving sizeable development profits. Too many people seem quite able 
to struggle with their consciences and win. Furthermore, extending the 
social conscience by educating internal changes in attitude is a never- 
ending effort. In the meantime, numerous policy and program decisions 
are being made daily— by private parties and by local, state, and federal 
governments. These decisions stem from no comprehensive understanding of 
duties and obligations to the public interest. Implementing the public 
trust doctrine would institutionalize these obligations.
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Chapter 5
Methods of Establishing Public Trusts
As indicated before, several avenues must be used in expanding and 
entrenching the public trust approach to resource management. These 
include: case lav development in the courts, constitutional amendments,
a variety of legislative approaches, new institutions to represent future 
generations, and trust-like private agreements. These approaches will 
probably be most effective if used in concert.
A. The Judiciary: Expanding Case Law
In the past, the public trust doctrine owed its finest moments —  
and its eventual near-disappearance' —  to judicial decisions^^^One of 
the most direct means of vitalizing the trust doctrine is to plead its 
existence and application in the courts. A number of attorneys are 
moving in this direction. It requires a careful selection of appropriate 
cases and innovative briefing.
There are two main approaches that can be used. One seeks the trust 
doctrine in specific statutory language, such as the law creating the 
Redwood National Park, discussed below. The attorneys using this approach 
argue that the law creates a trust relationship which the courts should 
enforce.
The second major approach involves arguing that the public trust 
already exists, that it is an implied and expandable understanding that 
attends all property ownership. In essence, it is contended that the
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passage of title from the crown or federal government to private parties 
created a resulting or presumptive trust. The recipient of the title is 
duty-hound to use his property only in ways that do not impair present 
and future public interests.
In either case, it will have to be argued that the public trust 
imposes important and reasonable duties on proprietors and other holders 
of interests in land.
B. Constitutional Amendment
Another place to experiment with the public trust doctrine is in 
constitutions.
In the past five years, there has been an enormous interest in 
providing constitutional protection for the environment. Numerous law 
review articles, state constitutional provisions, and environmental law­
suits have pushed the case for a constitutionally protected environment
The lawsuits have generally argued that the present U.S. Constitution 
does in fact contain rights and duties with respect to the environment 
Most often, reliance is placed upon the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution:
The enumeration, in this constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others 
retained by the people.
Three U.S. Supreme Court justices have agreed that this amendment does
in fact contemplate the assertion of important rights, even if they are
not explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution.^^^
Another approach is to argue that rights expressed in the
Constitution automatically imply other ri^ts not expressed. This line
of reasoning is supported in a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Griswold
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V. Connecticut announced that there were "penumhral ri^ts," rights that 
are not found, in the Constitution, but which are logically implied by 
the rigjits expressed there. These penumbral rights "give life and sub- 
stance"^^^ to the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. For example, 
it is argued by legal scholars —  although courts have not agreed —  
that the ri^t to life expressed in the 5th and l4th Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution necessarily implies that persons have a right to be free of 
health-impairing pollutants in the air or w a t e r . T h e  right to life is 
thus seen as giving constitutional status to the right to a clean, health­
ful environment.
It is unclear whether either of these constitutional approaches —  
or the variety of others in use —  will ever be successful. The attempts 
to date have nearly all failed.
Another, more protracted alternative is the direct amendment of 
the federal or state constitutions. On the federal level, this option 
appears remote. It appears virtually impossible —  if not dangerous —  
to set in motion the cumbersome federal machinery that would be required 
to initiate a federal constitutional convention, althou^ numerous pro­
posals to do so have come and gone in recent years. Acting at the 
state level —  although it could result nationally in an inconsistent body 
of constitutional law —  appears to be best option. Numerous commenta­
tors have written that the states should use their constitutions as "little 
laboratories" for the testing of new ri^ts and institutions.^^®
Since the mid-1950s, there has been a rash of state constitutional 
revisions,^^9 and the experience with environmental quality provisions 
is not completely disheartening. For example, the states of Virginia,
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North Carolina, Montana, New Mexico, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Penn­
sylvania have all recently adopted constitutional provisions on environ­
mental quality. Each is discussed and briefly analyzed below, proceeding 
from the weaker provisions to the stronger.
1. Virginia and North Carolina
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use 
and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and 
other natural resources, it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth 
to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources, its public 
lands and its historical sites and buildings. Further, it shaü.1 
be the Commonwealth’s policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, 
and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the 
benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the 
Commonwealth.
In the furtherance of such policy, the General Assembly may undertake 
the conservation, development, or utilization of lands or natural 
resources of the Commonwealth, the acquisition and protection of 
historical sites and buildings, and the protection of its atmosphere, 
lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, by 
agencies of the Commonwealth or by the creation of public authorities, 
or by leases or other contracts with agencies of the United States, 
with other states, with units of government in the Commonwealth, or 
with private persons or corporations. (Virginia Constitution,
Article XI, Sections 1 and 2) (Emphasis added)
It shall be the policy of this State to conserve and protect its 
lands and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry, and to this 
end it shall be a proper function of the State of North Carolina 
and its political subdivisions to acquire and preserve park, 
recreational, and scenic areas, to control and limit the pollution 
of our air and water, to control excessive noise, and in every other 
appropriate way to preserve as a part of the common heritage of this 
State its forests, wetlands, estuaries, beaches, historical sites, 
openlands, and places of beauty. (North Carolina Constitution, 
Article XIV, Section 5) (Emphasis added)
Virginia and North Carolina provisions are quite similar and quite 
weak. They announce state policy and authorize (but do not require) a 
wide variety of environmental actions which the state legislature mi^t 
take.
Althougii they provide constitutional underpinnings for statutory 
efforts, they do not accomplish much without very innovative legislative 
action.
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2. Montana
(1) The State and each person shall maintain and improve a clean 
and healthful environment in Montana for present and future 
generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and 
enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the pro­
tection of the environmental life support system from degrada­
tion and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable 
depletion and degradation of natural resources.
(Article IX, Section l) (Emphasis added)
The Montana provisions create a generalized duty "to maintain and
improve a clean and healthful environment... for present and future
generations." The duty admirably recognizes a commitment to future
generations. The vord "maintain" suggests a kind of non-degradation
policy for the state's environment.
However, sub-section (2) removes the self-executive potential of
the provision by basing its effect on legislative action. Unless the
legislature acts, there appears to be no enforceable duty. Since courts
are not often willing to prod legislative action, the provision is likely
to be regarded as merely hortatory language.
Under sub-section (3), no citizen remedies have become law. After
two sessions of defeated attempts, the legislature adopted a citizen
suit bill only to have it vetoed by the Governor.
3. New Mexico
The protection of the state's beautiful and healthful environment 
is hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to the public 
interest, health, safety and the general welfare. The legislature 
shall provide for the control of pollution and control of despoil­
ment of the air, water and other natural resources of this state, 
consistent with the use and development of these resources for 
the maximum benefit of the people.
(Article XX, Section 21) (Emphasis added)
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New Mexico’s provision is also composed of weak policy language with 
a mandate for legislative action. In addition, the legislature's power 
to protect the environment is balanced against the use and development 
of resources "for the maximum benefit" of people. It is not clearly 
specified that "people" includes future generations.
1». Illinois
The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to 
provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this 
and future generations. The General Assembly shall provide by law 
for the implementation and enforcement of this public policy.
Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person 
may enforce this ri^t against any party, governmental or private, 
through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limita­
tion and regulation by law.
(Article XI, Sections 1 and 2) (Emphasis added)
Illinois' provisions create a citizen right to a "healthful 
environment" and allow citizen litigation to enforce the ri^t. The 
right has been construed to be self-executing. The legislature can act 
to reduce multiple or harrassment suits under the provisions.
Protecting a "healthful" environment, however, may not be enough. 
Somewhere short of the absolute minimum needed to protect human health 
there is a considerable range of environmental quality and amenities that 
could be lost. In other words, the provision may only speak to the possi­
bility of existence, not its quality.
5. Massachusetts
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom 
from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, 
historic, and aesthetic qualities of their environment; and the 
protection of the people in their right to the conservation, develop­
ment and utilization of the agricultural,, mineral, forest, water, 
air and other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public 
purpose.
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The general court shall have the pover to enact legislation 
necessary or expedient to protect such rights.
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court 
shall have the power to provide for the taking, upon payment 
of just compensation therefore, or for the acquisition hy purchase 
or otherwise, of lands and easements or such other interests there­
in as may be deemed necessary to accomplish these purposes.
Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes shall not 
be used for other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by laws 
enacted by a two thirds vote, taken by yeas and nays, of each branch 
of the general court.
(Article 97 of the Amendments) (Emphasis added)
The Massachusetts provisions contain an explicit constitutional right, 
However, it is not clear that the right can be enforced without legis­
lative action. It is stipulated that the acquisition of land or ease­
ments for environmental purposes, by condemnation, purchase, or agreement, 
is constitutionally permissible. And, once acquired, these interests 
in land are protected from legislative diversion by an extraordinary 
majority requirement. In a sense, acquired resources are placed in an 
environmental "trust.**
6. Pennsylvania
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the 
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values 
of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are 
the common property of all the people, including generations yet to 
come. As a trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall con­
serve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
(Article I, Section 27) (Emphasis added)
Pennsylvania's constitutional provision is the strongest in the 
country and admirably includes the notion of trusteeship; however, so 
far it has been applied forcefully only to publicly owned natural 
resources of the s t a t e . A s  discussed previously, the distinction
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between public and private ownership needs considerable ecologically- 
based refinement if an effective public trust and a realistic notion of 
property are to be established. Hopefully, it will be established that 
private property and activities with public import will be subjected to 
the Pennsylvania trust provisions.
7. Summary and Conclusions
The weaknesses of the above provisions lead to the following 
conclusions:
a, Provisions urging-or even mandating— legislative action to protect 
the environment or urging legislative action to grant citizen reme­
dies to protect the environment are much too weak. They are 
unenforceable in the face of legislative i n a c t i o n . ^ ^ l  Provisions 
must be self-exec;-ting— that is, they must create duties which 
operate independently of legislative action to insure that imple­
mentation will occur.
b. Provisions should be written with an eye to their heuristic (or 
prod) value. Drafting them to encourage innovative legal investi­
gation and briefing would help assure that the complexities of 
environmental provisions would at least be explored. In other 
words, constitutional provisions should be used to open new politi­
cal/legal vistas, not solely as an attempt to resolve a few old 
problems.
c. All of the constitutional conventions tended to handle environmental 
issues with kid gloves. Accordingly, major new concepts in environ-
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mental lav vere not thoroughly studied, treated, or debated in depth 
and, with the exception of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, were 
not adopted.
It. None of the provisions requires monitoring of its effectiveness. 
Consequently, very little has been done to see if the various 
provisions are operative at all.
Adopting strong state constitutional provisions will require a
considerable amount of work. Serious political difficulties —  including
the myth that the federal Fifth Amendment takings clause creates a right
172to maximum profit from the land —  will need to be overcome.
Additionally, the benefits of adopting strong provisions- —  such as 
a public trust provision —  may not become noticeable immediately. But 
adopting a trust provision would clearly establish that the environment 
has constitutional status and that rights associated with environmental 
quality can be enforced.
8. Sample Public Trust Provisions
Following are two possible public trust provisions for state 
constitutions. The first is brief and quite general:
Section 1: It is hereby declared that a high quality environment
shall be maintained and enhanced as a public trust for the benefit 
of present and future generations.
Section 2; Agencies of the state and private parties have 
an enforceable right and responsibility to protect the fundamental 
qualities of this trust.
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Althou^ a number of constitution -writers advise brevity in the 
drafting of constitutional provisions, that is not an end in itself. A 
wordier, more specific provision might read:
Section 1: To protect the public health, safety, and general
welfare, the basic quality and necessary attributes of the environ­
ment— including but not limited to clean air, unsullied water, 
freedom from excessive noise, undefiled landscapes, soil produc­
tivity, nutrient cycles, critical minerals, important energy 
sources, important wildlife populations and habitats, and prime 
agricultural lands— are hereby constituted a public trust. They 
shall be managed, regardless of current or future ownership, in 
a steward-like fashion, respectful of the needs of present and 
future generations.
Section 2: Ownership or use rights involving these basic -
attributes are subject to the ultimate principles that present 
generations are transients on the earth and that there can be no 
ownership right eliminating or unduly limiting the options or 
prospects of present or future generations.
Section 3: The public trust shall not be violated without
a clear showing that there exist no feasible and prudent alterna­
tives and that the proposed violation promotes essential public 
purposes.
Section Each person shall have the right to a clean and 
healthful environment. A corresponding obligation to protect and 
promote a clean and healthful environment is hereby recognized.
Section 5: No person shall be denied a speedy remedy to
exercise the above rights and to enforce the above obligations.
C. State Legislatures or Congress: the Public Trust in Statutes
Joseph Sax, one of the leading exponents of public trust theory, 
believes that statutes, not constitutions, provide the best chance of 
implementing the trust doctrine.^73 jje has argued that it is important 
to beef up the role of the courts in environmental disputes but that 
the courts should not be the final arbiter. Preserving the legislature's 
supremacy in environmental matters necessitates that any environmental
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rights he announced at this statutory, not constitutional levels. As 
evidence. Sax cites the history of conservative courts striking down 
needed regulatory legislation.
1. Michigan Environmental Protection Act
A number of arguments could be raised against Sax's position, but 
he is in part vindicated in practice. A promising statute, Michigan's 
1970 Environmental Protection Act (EPA), is the product of his rationale 
and draftsmanship.
The act is short and simple in form and far reaching in its effect.
It empowers governmental and private entities to sue other public or' 
private entities "...for the protection of the air, water and other 
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment, 
or destruction."175
The role of the courts in environmental disputes is expanded somewhat 
by the act. In suits brought under it, courts may analyze the reason­
ableness of existing environmental protection standards and, if a 
standard is found to be deficient, may order the adoption of an adequate 
standard.
The act also provides a kind of burden of proof shift. In typical 
court cases, the party making allegations must carry the burden of proof 
throughout the litigation. The Michigan EPA provides that when plain­
tiffs make a prima facie case that pollution, air or water quality 
degradation, or other natural resource damage will occur, the burden of 
proof shifts to the defendants. The defendants then have several 
options for rebutting the case. They can submit evidence to the contrary 
(as is the traditional procedure) or, as an affirmative defense, can
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argue that there is "no feasible and prudent alternative" to their conduct 
and that such conduct is "...consistent with the promotion of the 
public health, safety, and welfare in light of the state's paramount 
concern for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction."^77
What does all this language amount to? Since passage of the 
Michigan. EPA, about ten dozen environmental suits have been f i l e d . ^78 
In general, these suits have shown that a swift and thoughtful resolution 
of environmental disputes can be had under the act; governmental agencies 
can be successfully pressured if the pressure is legally grounded and 
enforceable; lawsuits can release agencies from financially based politi­
cal pressures; lawsuits can lead to successful negotiated settlements; 
and agencies will actually employ the act affirmatively to curb environ­
mental excesses.^79
To date, only one suit has gone to the Michigan State Supreme 
Court. In that case, the court was unable to rule on the merits of the suit 
since there were not sufficient findings of fact from the lower c o u r t .  
However, the general tone of the court appears very receptive to the 
act.
A number of other states have adopted statutes following Michigan's 
lead.lGl Although there has not been as much litigation experience 
under those enactments, it appears that the statutory approach to the 
public trust doctrine is viable and should not be overlooked.
2. Nantucket Sound Islands Trust
Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Gerry Studds have introduced 
legislation to establish the Nantucket Sound Islands Trust —  a proposal
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to protect certain islands off the coast of Massachusetts. 1^2 trust
is created to protect a wide variety of values found on the islands: 
scenic, ecological, scientific, historic, recreational and other values. 
Certain activities are expressly prohibited (the construction of a bridge 
or causeway from the mainland) ; certain other activities are restrained 
(random subdivision, beach development, etc.); and others are expressly 
allowed (the general exercise of private property rights).
Three trust commissions are established to protect the values of 
the islands. Their composition is admirably broad —  federal, state, 
local, landowner, taxpayer, environmental, and youth representatives 
are selected —  and they are directed to classify the islands into 
three categories: lands forever wild; scenic preservation lands; and
town planned lands. Local land use planning is not supplanted by the 
commissions; however the commissions are empowered to review the local 
regulations to check their compliance with the purposes of the trust.
The commissions can adopt necessary land use regulations no less restric­
tive than those imposed by the state or locality.
The Kennedy trust legislation is littered with duties —  non-dis- 
cretionary duties —  which are imposed u%)on the trust commissions and the 
Secretary of the Interior as trustees. The word ’’shall" is common in 
the legislation and indicates the clearly mandatory construction of 
numerous provisions in the act.
One additional provision in the House version is quite novel.
It directs the Secretary of Labor to examine the trust lands for oppor­
tunities to experiment with aquaculture, to examine other options for 
employment opportunities compatible with the act, and to investigate 
and establish appropriate re-training programs occasioned by the act.^^3
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Unfortunately, the act as drafted does not carry through the logic 
of a trust framework. No particular beneficiary is identified and it 
is not clear on the face of the measure who can enforce the policies and 
duties of the act.
3* Redwood National Park
The importance of imposing non-discretionary duties can be seen in 
the case of the Redwood National Park. In legislation establishing the 
Redwood National Park and the national park system, Congress required 
the Secretary of the Interior to protect the timber, soil, and streams 
of the Park from adverse impacts. Congress specifically demanded that the 
secretary "conserve the scenery and natural and historic objects and 
the wildlife" of the national parks so that they could be enjoyed un­
impaired by future generations.^®^ In addition. Congress authorized the 
Secretary to acquire lands adjacent to the national parks —  or to enter 
into contracts or cooperative agreements with adjacent landowners —  
so as "...to afford as full protection as is reasonably possible to the 
timber, soil, and streams within the boundaries" of the parks.
(Emphasis added) Congress was especially worried that forest management, 
timber practices, land uses, and soil practices on adjacent private lands 
might adversely affect the resources of the parks.
Notwithstanding these rather clear legal requirements, the Secretary 
of the Interior made no effort to comply. Five studies commissioned 
by the Secretary showed clear damage to the Redwood National Park from 
erosion, mud slides, and siltation —  all caused by timber harvesting on 
adjacent lands. In a pending citizen group lawsuit, a federal court has 
held that the Secretary must "exercise and perform duties imposed" by the
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Redwood National Park Act .186 court vent on to direct the Secretary
to afford the fullest reasonable protection possible to the park resources 
from activities on adjacent lands. The court instructed the Secretary to 
consider acquiring title or interest to adjacent lands, to consider 
contracts or cooperative agreements with the owners of adjacent lands, 
and to consider possible modification of the park boundaries, including 
a full report to the Congress if additional funds were needed to protect 
the park.l^^
In sum, since Congress took the time to define clear duties for the 
protection of park lands, it became much easier for private parties to 
insure that the Secretary of the Interior did in fact protect them. A 
generalized statute simply authorizing park management would not have 
been effective. It was important that Congress provided clear trust-like 
duties and that citizens acted as beneficiaries by monitoring agency 
compliance with those duties.
1*. Wisconsin Water Quality Act
In Wisconsin, the public trust notion was incorporated in the state’s 
water quality laws. The laws restrict land development in proximity to 
water courses in order to "...aid in the fulfillment of the state’s 
role as trustee of its navigable waters and to promote public health, 
safety, convenience and general w e l f a r e . "188 (Emphasis added) The state's 
residents, accordingly, are the beneficiaries.
In 1972, a private landowner challenged an ordinance adopted 
pursuant to this statute. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the ordinance. 
In doing so, the court said:
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The active public trust duty of the state of Wisconsin in 
respect to navigable waters requires the state not only to promote 
navigation but also to protect and preserve those waters for 
fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty.(Emphasis added)
The court noted that the law did not prevent the landowner from using
his land in "natural and indigenous" ways and that the proposed use
(filling a wetland) was environment ally damaging. Therefore, the court
held that the proposed use was "not a reasonable use of the land which is
protected from police power regulation."190
In short, the trust doctrine can buttress the police power of the
state and at the same time, assure that there is an enforceable duty to
exercise that power.
5. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act is discussed in detail in
Chapter 8, The act does contain the notion of trusteeship. In outlining
goals for all agencies, Section 2 of the act declares that:
...it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government 
to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential 
considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate 
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that 
the Nation may —
(1) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as 
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations;...
(Emphasis added)
The operation of this casual reference to the trust doctrine is 
still in limbo. However, it can be said that, in general, an operative 
trust provision should be more detailed to be effective.
D. Institutions to Consider Future Generations
As argued previously, there will be future generations of humans —  
beginning with our children —  who will be needing the life-support
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capabilities of the planet. Institutions exist which represent nearly 
every conceivable present interest: consumer, environmentalist, agri­
cultural, labor, and so on- (Even the past is represented to a limited 
extent with the weakly enforceable statutes and regulations for the 
protection of antiquities.)191 However, there are no institutions 
systematically assessing or representing the claims and Options of the 
future. Consideration of such institutions must be placed on the agenda.
1. ]Problems of Representing Future Generations[
There are difficulties in implementing the trust doctrine with 
respect to future generations, most noticeably perhaps in the case of 
energy and mineral resources. At present, there are no optimal resource 
exploitation rates being set by governments, energy/minerals corporations, 
or anyone else. In order to act with genuine respect for the claims of 
the future, just such a task must be undertaken. Rates of extraction, 
consumption, and recycling must be set and attained. The difficulty is 
HOW. How, for example, are we to decide the optimum rate for exploit­
ing a non-renewable resource which, once used in a commodity, is un­
available for future use?
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen has explored these dilemmas briefly. He 
notes quite accurately that "the economic activity of any generation has 
some influence on that of future generations... One of the most impor­
tant ecological problems for mankind ... is the relationship of the 
quality of life of one generation with another —  more specifically, the 
distribution of mankind’s dowry among all generations."192 (Emphasis 
added)
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However, he believes that there is a decisive inability of economists 
to deal with the problem: "Economics cannot even dream of handling this
problem. The object of economics ... is the administration of scarce 
resources; but to be exact, we should add that this administration 
regards only one generation. It could not be otherwise .... The market 
mechanism cannot protect mankind from ecological crises in the future (let 
alone to allocate resources optimally among generations) even if we would 
try to set the prices 'right'."^93 (Emphasis added)
Whether this limitation is insurmountable in economics or not, it 
is clear that no other discipline will find the dilemmas any simpler.
"These questions...are not susceptible of easy, convincing a n s w e r s ."^9^
Some answers must be attempted however. Georgescu-Roegen offers a necessary 
but, by itself, insufficient suggestion: "The only way to protect the
generations, at least from the excessive consumption of resources during 
the present bonanza, is by reeducating ourselves so as to feel some 
sympathy for our future fellow humans in the same way in which we have 
cone to be interested in the well-being of our contemporary 'neighbors '."195 
There is some doubt whether the amount of interest and sympathy presently 
shown between contempories would accomplish much in the way of protecting 
present generations, not to mention future ones. In addition "reeducat­
ing ourselves" on its own may well be a luxury too leisurely to be afforded. 
Mere is certainly required. And sooner. For as Georgescu-Roegen admits : 
"Because pollution is a surface phenomenon which also strikes the genera­
tion which produces it, we may rest assured that it will receive much 
more official attention than its inseparable companion, resource deple­
tion. "19&
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4.U J.O — j that decisions made in the mid-1970s, particularly
in the energy/minerals area, will determine most decisively the future of 
today's young and humans unhorn. No magic formula for making these 
decisions can be offered.
2. ]Proposed Solutions[
However, the closely related notions of trusteeship and guardianship 
present clear opportunities to establish a legally enforceable duty to 
consider and evaluate publicly the claims of future generations in 
reasonable fashion.
Guardians are commonly appointed by the courts to protect the person 
and property of one who is unable to manage his own affairs. A guardian 
is typically court-supervised, and is required to care for the person 
and property, representing him in legal proceedings, contractual obliga­
tions, and so on.
When the claims of future generations are at stake, a guardian 
could be appointed to examine and represent the claims of the future 
before appropriate legislative committees, administrative agencies, and 
the courts. The guardian could be empowered and funded to investigate 
and make formal findings of fact concerning disputes involving the 
future. In short, the guardian would assure that the claims of future 
generations were adequately presented to the decision-making body and 
reviewing courts.
Guardianship would be largely ineffective if it were not operated 
in conjunction with the public trust approach. The guardian could make 
necessary investigations and report to the trustee of the resource in 
controversy. Thereupon, the trustee could be required to make a clear
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and convincing showing to demonstrate that the claims of the future were 
in fact evaluated and reflected in final decisions setting maximum 
extraction and consumption rates. In addition, the courts —  if called 
upon by appropriate parties arguing for either higjier or lower rates —  
could require the trustee to carry the burden in demonstrating that this 
type of inquiry was conducted. The court could then pass on the adequacy 
of the effort after a probing• review. (See Chapter 10, Strengthening 
Judicial Review.)
Certainly, this procedure requires grappling with exceedingly 
complex issues. But the questions of intergenerational equity do not 
become any easier when they are ignored.
Another proposal for institutionalizing the claims of the future 
can be offered for consideration. A hi^ level court for deliberation 
on the claims of future generations could be established. The court could 
be structured along the lines of the present U.S. Supreme Court, although 
it would need a sizeable staff and research capability to secure data 
relevant to disputes on the claims of the future. (The court would 
need more than the standard law library. ) It could be situated between 
the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court. Its juris­
diction could be limited to disputes significantly affecting future inter­
ests —  such as rates of resource depletion, use of persistent pesticides, 
and so on.
Cases with import for future generations could wind their way 
through the present court system. Beyond the Circuit Courts, however, 
appeal could be made to the "Court of the Future." If the case did in 
fact raise matters within the court's Jurisdiction its merits could be 
heard. Final appeal could still be made to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Specialized courts are not popular.197 Even without a special court 
to adjudicate future claims, it remains clear that decision-makers must 
and will make decisions affecting the future. They can do it explicitly 
or "by default. Trusteeship —  and its companion, guardianship —  are 
the major and perhaps the only legal concepts available for the task 
of explicit future-respecting decisions.
E. Private Agreements
The most prevalent form of private agreement resembling a trust 
doctrine approach is the "easement.” In fact, one of the ancestors of 
the trust doctrine, the common law of dedication, was based on an ease­
ment approach. Typically, a landowner would dedicate a use right or other 
interest in his private lands. The public interest created thereby 
was protected from a landowner or successor wishing to change his mind.
The landowner was in effect made a trustee of the land for the public 
benefit. In this way, roads, parks, and public markets were created
and protected.198
Property has often been described as a bundle of rights and 
opportunities. Vrhen a landowner sells an easement, he parts with some 
of that bundle.
Typically, in the case of "conservation easements," a private 
landowner sells certain development options.^99 por example, a farmer 
could sell the option to subdivide his land to a governmental agency or 
a non-profit conservation organization. The buyer of such an easement 
typically receives benefits from having the land confined to agricultural 
or conservation purposes. The seller of the easement receives a cash 
payment plus property and inheritance tax benefits. Conservation
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easement legislation has teen established in numerous states. Whether 
it is a comprehensive land use planning tool remains in doubt.
Easements of this type apparently do not run afoul of constitutional 
prohibitions against perpetuities, so they can be used to assure that 
certain lands always will be used for important purposes.
It should be noted that the practice of buying conservation easements 
sets a somewhat dangerous precedent. The public —  or a non-profit 
group —  pays for a landowner’s promise to engage in good land practices.
If the easement does not contain perpetual duties enforceable against 
the present and future landowners, the public payment could constitute 
an inappropriate subsidy. In addition, it is not clear that the public 
should have to pay to attain desirable land use practices, such as pro­
tecting the productivity of prime agricultural lands.
Another private avenue for a trust-like approach deserves mention.
The community land trust is an increasingly popular form of self-limita­
tion in land use p l a n n i n g . I f  the land trust included self-imposed 
duties and clear enforcement powers granted to parties likely to compel 
enforcement, it mi^t prove a viable and creative tool in land use 
planning, (it would probably need legislative or constitutional embellish­
ment to avoid the pitfalls of the rule against perpetuities.)201
A final voluntary way to resolve environmental controversies and, 
at the same time, to overcome some of the stiff transitional difficulties 
in pursuing environmental quality, is to structure bargaining procedures 
and incentives.
A good example mi^t be the present sheep predation problem. The 
sheep industry is in difficult straits. Numerous sheep ranchers contend 
that the coyote is the major cause of their difficulties. Environmentalists
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rebut this contention, but pressure mounts for repeal of the federal 
executive order banning use by sheep ranchers of certain predator poisons 
on federal lands. The controversy weakens the chance that environmental 
groups and farm/ranching interests will get together on common concerns 
(e.g., massive industrial use of scarce western water).
Kaybe there is a better solution. Wool is a good clothing material 
and costs less in energy to produce than rayon, nylon, dacron, etc.; 
lamb is good food. If the sheep industry —  despite its excesses —  is 
something of an essential industry , perhaps we should all pay the price 
to keep it healthy while at the same time assuring, as a condition of that 
support, that the excesses of overgrazing and poison usage are curbed.
Suppose the sheep industry's existing public subsidy could be supple­
mented to encourage a shift back to the predator-controlling, labor- 
intensive method of s h e e p h e r d i n g . 2 0 2  ^ number of jobs would be created, 
the need for poisons could be reduced or eliminated, and, perhaps, the 
industry could rediscover its viability.
All very rosy perhaps. The point is that searching for this type 
of solution is a good first step. Structuring voluntary bargaining pro­
cesses is promising if resulting agreements, once entered, operate in a 
trust-like fashion.
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Chapter 6 
Is the Public Trust Constitutional?
There are two primary sources of governmental power and one 
primary limitation that must be considered in evaluating the constitutior 
ality of public trusts. The federal commerce power, the state's police 
power, and the federal and state limitations on takings of private 
property are explored below.
A. The Public Trust and the Commerce Clause
The primary source of federal authority in the environmental area is 
the so-called "commerce clause." The U.S. Constitution provides that 
Congress shall have the power "to regulate Commerce...among the several 
S t a t e s . ( s i n c e  the federal government has only those powers 
expressly granted or "necessary and proper" to carry out expressed power: 
a clear source of authority for proposed actions is essential.)20U
The commerce clause has been interpreted quite broadly by the court: 
Under the clause, the federal government can prevent misuse of channels 
of commerce, protect entities engaged in interstate commerce, and régulai 
a variety of activities which affect c o m m e r c e . The primary boundary 
of the commerce clause is drawn when the federal government tries to 
regulate activities or entities "...which are completely within a parti­
cular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not 
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general 
powers of the government."206 However, this limitation has not prevents
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Congress from regulating even local activities which arguably affect 
interstate commerce. As applied in pollution matters. Congressional power 
under the commerce clause is "practically unbounded."20% in general, 
it is held that since air, water, and odor pollution have no particular 
address and can easily cross state lines, they can be regulated. Pol­
lution’s effects are recognized as being complex and, in many cases, 
quite injurious to interstate travel and commercial operations.
Beyond pollution. Congress’ environmental powers are somewhat 
shakier, but they are d e v e l o p i n g . I n  both endangered species legisla­
tion and land use regulation, it seems that federal regulatory power will 
be upheld.
Given increased recognition of the importance and complexity of 
the environment, it does not seem at all unreasonable to expect that the 
federal government will be constitutionally able to participate in the 
trust framework outlined above.
B. The Public Trust and the Police Power
Unlike the federal government, the states have inherent authority 
to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity and to 
protect public safety, health, morals and general welfare. The
police power is "the least limit able of the exercises of government" and 
"...is not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, 
or unsanitary, but extends to what is for the greatest welfare of the
state."210
The use of the police power to promote legitimate environment el
quality objectives has been universally sustained. These objectives
include all of the trustable subject matters discussed above and numerous
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others as well. (For example, a considerable number of jurisdictions 
have upheld regulatory measures designed strictly to protect aesthetic 
values.)211
There appears to be no special obstacle —  other than standard 
constitutional safeguards of due process, equal protection, and the 
developing right to travel^^^ —  to extension of the police power to allow 
implementation of the public trust doctrine. The primary reason for using 
a trust approach rather than the police power by itself is that the need 
is to structure more demanding duties, not mere authorizations.
C. The Public Trust and the Taking Problem
Of course, neither the federal government’s commerce power nor the 
state's police power —  or any other governmental power —  can be 
exercised with reckless abandon. There are a number of constitutional 
limitations —  such as due process and equal protection —  which must 
be observed.
One of the most direct constitutional limitations on governmental 
authority in the environmental area is the "takings clause" of the Fifth 
Amendment. The clause is quite lean in appearance; however, like so many 
other legal commonplaces, it carries with it an exceedingly coc^lex 
body of law. The Fifth Amendment is repeated in nearly all state consti­
tutions .
It reads as follows:
...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
The current law on "takings" of private property is one of the 
thorniest legal problems at hand.213 nearly every environment-
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related controversy, the taking issue surfaces. Opponents of land use 
regulatory measures are frequently given to argue that a particular 
regulation amounts to an unconstitutional taking of private property.
This is a complicated charge to answer since, as noted hy Sax,
"...few legal problems have proved as resistant to analytic efforts as 
that posed by the Constitution’s requirement that private property 
not be taken for public use without payment of just compensation.
Althou^ the compensation provision has much to say for itself, 
two legal myths are often found at the root of land use planning opponents' 
arguments. One is that property owners are free to do anything with the 
land they own. The other is that government must compensate landowners 
if regulations reduce or eliminate profit-making options on their land.
Althou^ the courts have not consistently supported either of these 
two beliefs, they are widely held and have a substantial influence on 
the regulatory activities of local and state governments.
The current popular conception of the takings clause is something 
of an historical anomaly.^^5 Little clear intent can be found in the 
deliberations on early colonial constitutions and the federal consti­
tution. ̂ l6 It is clear, though, that the takings clause did not affect 
strictly regulatory powers until the late 19th Century.^^7
In early American cases, the takings clause was typically not used 
to strike down regulations. Compensation was not generally required 
unless property was actually taken from the landowner or entered upon 
for public use.
By the 1920s, however, the takings clause gained new importance 
when the U.S. Supreme Court applied it to a regulatory statute.^l^ 
Pennsylvania was experiencing problems with land subsidence caused by
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underground, coal mining. A statute vas enacted prohibiting such mining 
under municipalities of a certain class. The court struck down the statute, 
uttering the now-controversial statement that " —  if regulation goes 
too far it will be recognized as a taking."^^9
Since that time, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided a number of 
unclear zoning cases, but, in general, has left the law of taking to 
state courts. As a result, "there are very few subjects on which one 
cannot find cases going both ways on very similar facts.
This confused status of the law begs for correction. Good faith 
efforts at local land use planning are being unduly stifled. Establishing 
the public trust doctrine could have the salutary effect of rolling the 
taking issue back to its earlier parameters —  particularly in the area 
of environmental protection. If adopted at the constitutional level, the 
public trust doctrine could be forcefully balanced against the takings 
clause, whose application should be limited to actual taking or entry 
upon the premises. (This is not to say that there are not important 
compensation questions raised in the regulation of land issues. However, 
these are most properly matters that should be handled at the statutory 
level —  not by straining a constitutional provision such as the takings 
clause.) Adopting this approach would re-establish the principle that, 
as a general rule, public bodies need not pay to obtain good land manage­
ment or to maintain environmental quality.
The trust doctrine would clearly announce that private rights are 
subject to enforceable environmental restraints and that there are 
substantial public interests that can be impacted if ecological princi­
ples are ignored. Unless this is done, it is likely that the takings 
clause will maintain its unjustified legal and political status.
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Chapter T 
Conclusion
A healthy environment, the sine qua non of all human activity, 
oddly enough does not have a solidly protected legal status. That may 
seem understandable since the strongest legal protections typically have 
been reserved to protect private, financial arrangements. (The standard 
trust, for example, is a way to leave a sizeable estate to the grand­
children without exposing it to profligacy.) However, as emphasized 
throughout this report, we need public as well as private trusts, be­
cause trusts are applicable to all those aspects of a high-quality environ­
ment have great public importance.
As can be seen from the above, establishing the public trust 
approach requires that it be assembled from a variety of legal sources.
It is not, in the history of law, neatly presented on a platter. How­
ever, the precedents are clearly visible and it is imperative that they 
be pulled together.
The public trust approach is not as simple as are proposals for 
transferring the environment to public ownership. In fact, the importance 
of the doctrine is that it transcends the debate between public and private 
ownership and avoids many of its pitfalls. The adversary institutional 
arrangement created by the public trust approach is more important than 
the details of actual title. The establishment of clearly enforceable
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duties —  enforceable by and against clearly identifiable parties —  
is the crux of the matter.
One of the most highly-touted principles of equity is that for 
every vrong, there is a remedy. Unless the expanded public trust approach 
is adopted and applied on a broad front, that principle —  in the environ- 
menteil area —  will continue to ring hollow. Under the present legal 
approach to environmental disputes, numerous wrongs committed against 
the public and against future generations are simply not remedied.
The public trust approach is not an exclusive approach and could 
be admirably supplemented by a wide variety of regulatory and incentive 
methods in pursuit of environmental protection. But it does provide an 
umbrella under which nearly all environmental controversies can be 
assessed in a more sensible, duty-laden context.. If it were established, 
the beginnings of a proper institutional approach to environmental 
protection would be secured.
It is difficult with any assurance to propose a timetable or 
specific path for the development of legal concepts. However, as noted 
above, trust law has a lengthy history and, in certain respects, is 
already established in American law —  in case law, in the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, in the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, in the 
Redwood National Park Act, and, weakly, in the National Environmental 
Policy Act. In addition, there is a strong argument that public trust 
obligations are implicit in all property ownership and that, therefore, 
the public trust approach needs only to be unearthed, not constructed.
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PART III
OTHER NEEDED CHANGES 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL INSTITUTIONS
Introduction
The public trust approach is a solid overall framework for making 
environmental decisions. However, other changes must he adopted along 
with the trust if it is to realize its potential. The most important 
of these can he grouped as follows:
1. National Environmental Policy Act
2. Citizen Participation
3. Strengthening Judicial Review and Other Changes 
Each area is discussed in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 8
The National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act (WEPA) is the primary environ­
mental statute in the United States. It requires a full assessment of 
proposed governmental actions and their impacts before the proposed actions 
are taken. NEPA procedures —  if altered in important respects outlined 
below —  could sustain and guide implementation of the public trust.
Environmental impact assessments were conducted on an ̂  hoc basis 
and in an inconsistent fashion before Congress enacted the National En­
vironmental Policy Act of 1969.^^^ President Richard Nixon signed it 
into law on January 1, 1970, opening what he termed a new decade of en­
vironmental concern and action. (Nixon actually had opposed the measure, 
but its overwhelming approval by Congress convinced him that a fanfare 
signature session was in order.)222 reaction of environmental groups
can be seen in the Conservation Foundation's newsletter. "New Federal 
Law May Be Giant Step on Road to Environmental Quality" read the headline. 
With only a minimum of skepticism, the newsletter proclaimed:
There's a new kid on the environmental block. He's- youag 
and quiet, and feeling his way. The old-timers are look­
ing him over, sizing him up. But whether they like him 
or not, they know they've got to deal with him. Because 
they suspect he packs a big wallop. And because he seems 
to have influence in high places.
This new kid is the Council on En-vlronmental Quality.
The wallop comes from the National Environmental Policy
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Act of 1969 (Public Law 9I-I9O) which empowers the 
Council, as well as all federal agencies, to deal 
strongly with environmental problems. The influence 
goes right to the White House and key places in 
Congress—  .
'The most important and far-reaching environmental 
measure ever enacted by Congress.' 'A milestone 
piece of legislation.’ 'An exciting new experi­
ment in government.' 'A lan^rk in the history of 
conservation legislation.'
As could be expected, the rhetoric outran the reality. Neither the 
President, the Congress, nor the public really understood how the act 
would affect agency decision-making.
A. Strengths of NEPA
A flood of writing has appeared on NEPA. The act has been called 
everything from "the most significant environmental legislation ever en­
acted" to a "sheep in wolf's clothing," "ineffective,and, in private, 
much worse. Conceptually, the requirements of NEPA are relatively simple. 
Congress has issued a mandate that the executive branch of the federal 
government begin weighing the environmental and socio-economic impacts 
of its policies, programs, actions, and legislative proposals and take 
steps, to mitigate any adverse impacts on the environment. A number of 
states have followed suit.^26
According to Frederick Anderson, the leading source on the judicial 
enforcement of NEPA, Congress intended five major purposes for the act:
(1) to enlarge federal agency mandates to include environmental policy 
goals; (2) to establish an action-forcing procedure for implementation 
of environmental policy; (3) to survey trends in environmental quality;
(It) to create the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ); and (5) to pro­
vide an annual report on the operation of the act and general environmental
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quality matters. "In retrospect," says Anderson, "the first two goals 
were hy far the most important.
Section 101 of KEPA recognizes the "...critical importance of re­
storing and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and 
development of man." Special substantive requirements of the act are 
also outlined:
(1) Fulfill the responsibilities of each genera­
tion as trustee of the environment for suc­
ceeding generations;
(2) Assure for all Americans safe, healthful, 
productive, and esthetically and culturally 
pleasing surroundings;
(3) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of 
the environment without degradation, risk to 
health or safety, or other undesirable and 
unintended consequences;
{k) Preserve important historic, cultural, and 
natural aspects of our national heritage, 
and maintain, wherever possible, an environ­
ment which supports diversity, and variety 
of individual choice;
(5) Achieve a balance between population and re­
source use which will permit high standards 
of living and wide sharing of life's ameni­
ties; and
(6) Enhance the quality of renewable resources 
and approach the maximum attainable recycling 
of depletable resources.(Emphasis added)
The most operative section of the act in Section 102. It requires that 
all agencies of the federal Government "shall, to the fullest extent possible:" 
(1) employ a systematic, interdisciplinary approach to insure the integrated . 
use of natural and social sciences in environmental decisions; (2) identify 
and develop methods, in consultation with the Council on Environmental 
Quality, to insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and
-94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
values will be given appropriate consideration in environmental decision­
making along with economic and technical considerations; and:
Include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other major 
Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on:
(i) The environmental impact of the pro­
posed action,
(ii) Any adverse environmental effects which 
cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented,
(iii) Alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) The relationship between local short­
term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long­
term productivity, and,
(v) Any irreversible and irretrievable com­
mitments of resources which would be in­
volved in the proposed action should it 
be implemented.22?
Simply put, NEPA requires agencies to look —  and explain publicly —  . 
before they leap; and whether they're "leaping" on a specific project or 
not, the act requires a continuing re-evaluation of agency policies.
Section 102 is the "reporting requirement" of NEPA. It has pro­
duced the familiar environmental impact statement (EIS) and has been con-
230strued in hundreds of court cases. By June 30, 197^» 3,3^^ environ­
mental statements had been prepared. An additional 2,086 were in draft
231form. Of course, the bald figures on the number or weight of EISs
don't tell much about their quality. A 1972 General Accounting Office
232study shows that at least the early NEPA statements had numerouse in­
adequacies. The continuing success of environmental litigation and a recently
completed private study of NEPA suggest that a number of key shortcomings
233still exist.
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The basic characteristics of the environmental impact statements 
reveal the strengths of NEPA. The preparation and circulation of an 
EIS means that, for the first time, agencies are required systematically 
to explain and justify their proposals not simply to a Congressional sub­
committee in the cumbersome and routinely boring appropriations process, 
but to the public in general.
These straight forward requirements probably have had a substantial 
effect on current environmental decision-making. Certainly, the public 
is receiving a good deal more information on projects that affect the en­
vironment. Since the EIS procedure is fairly well-defined, citizens can 
expect a period of time in which to organize, write letters, or contact 
an attorney. And, as with countless other environmental laws, it is dif­
ficult to measure the full benefits of the statute. Who knows how many 
environmentally ridiculous proposals have been dropped from a bureaucrat’s 
mind because an environmental statement and public review would show just 
how ridiculous they are? Who can say how many important changes in pro­
ject design have occurred under NEPA’s shadow?
The first major NEPA case made it clear that the act’s public report­
ing requirement was not hollow. The now-famous case involved the environ­
mental rules of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).^^^ A group of citizens 
contended that the rules were not sufficient under NEPA. AEG responded 
that, among other things, NEPA was too vague. In ruling against AEG, the 
court laid down landmark NEPA law:
...NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and "sys­
tematic" balancing analysis in each instance....
[and] requires that responsible officials of all 
agencies prepare a "detailed statement" covering 
the impact of particular actions on the environ­
ment, the environmental costs which might be avoided, 
and alternative measures which might alter the cost-
benefit equation,^^5
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The court noted that only in that fashion is it likely that the ’’...most 
intelligent, optimally beneficial decision vill ultimately be made."^^^
Referring to the reporting provisions of NEPA, the court stated:
...All of [the] Section 102 duties are qualified 
by the phrase "to the fullest extent possible."
We must stress as forcefully as possible that this 
language does not provide an escape hatch for foot- 
dragging agencies; it does not make NEPA’s pro­
cedural requirements somehow "discretionary."
Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper
tiger.^37
The court also made it clear that:
NEPA establishes environmental protection as an 
integral part of the Atomic Energy Commission's 
basic mandate. The primary responsibility for 
fulfilling that mandate lies with the Commission.
Its responsibility is not simply to sit back, 
like an umpire, and resolve adversary contentions 
at the hearing state. Rather, it must itself 
take the initiative of considering environmental 
values at every distinctive and comprehensive 
stage of the process....^3o
The court further referred to AECs interpretations of its responsibi­
lities under the act as "crabbed" and noted; "it seems an unfortunate af­
fliction of large organizations to resist new procedures and to envision 
massive roadblocks to their adoption."^39 ^n sum, the court held that 
"NEPA compels a case-by-case examination and balancing of discrete 
factors.
Since the Calvert Cliffs decision, courts have been quite strict in 
compelling agencies to follow NEPAs procedures. A ton of case law has 
explored these requirements and, in most instances, has bludgeoned agencies 
toward compliance.
So, it can be said that NEPA represents an admirable, if somewhat 
blind, attempt at environmental protection. It remains the most compre­
hensive statute guiding environmental decision-making, but the law has a
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number of decisive weaknesses that seriously limit its effectiveness and 
promise.
B. Weaknesses of NEPA
1. All Procedure and No Substance?
The NEPA procedures outlined above have been the subject of 
several hundred environmental lawsuits. The timing and adequacy of en­
vironmental statements, the adequacy of public consultation, the conçlete- 
ness of the impact assessment, and so on, are the typical issues raised 
in such litigation. Basically, these cases focus on the nature of agency 
steps before the final decision is made.
But what about the actual decision itself? Assuming the pro­
cedures are followed, is that the end of the matter? Is an agency free 
to spell out a list of horridly adverse impacts and then proceed with the 
harmful action anyway?
As noted previously, NEPA does contain a list of environmental 
goals. Section 101 of NEPA declares government policy to "foster and pro­
mote the general welfare" and "to create and maintain conditions under 
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony." Section 101 also 
imposes on all federal agencies a continuing responsibility to help the 
nation accomplish the six substantive goals listed above (see p. 9̂ ).
But, once an agency has carried out all the specific procedural requirements 
"...do courts have the power...to enforce the substantive declarations of 
§2 and 101 by reviewing agency action and setting it aside if it violates
(them]?"2^1 This question is proving the most often asked in the "second 
generation" of NEPA lawsuits.
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Althou^ the language of section 101 is somewhat vague, the
pH 3trend of NEPA cases seems to favor such review and enforcement.
But even thou^ the courts are showing a tendency to conduct 
substantive review, the results to date have been disappointing: "... it 
appears that every review of the merits of agency action for compliance 
with NEPA.. .has permÎ tted the action to p r o c e e d . P a r t l y ,  this court 
support of the agencies is traceable to the conventional rules of judi­
cial review of agency actions used by the courts. (See Strengthening 
Judicial Review below. )
Careful and continued briefing of the courts by attorneys on 
the substantive goals of NEPA is essential to establish that the Act is 
not simply a paper tiger. Although Congress can establish goals, only 
the agencies and, failing that, the courts are in an effective position to 
resolve disputes in specific cases and build precedent on substantive 
issues.
2. Coverage
Unfortunately, NEPA’s general requirements are not applied as 
widely, as they should be. Environmental statements are written only on 
major federal actions with significant effects —  and not even all of 
those. Some private projects are covered if they require federal 
agency approval or funding. And, as mentioned previously, a number of 
states have enacted "little NEPA’s" —  ̂virtual copies of the federal legis­
lation. Under these, state agencies are required to prepare environmental 
impact statements before taking major state actions with significant environ­
mental impacts. Most states do not apply these requirements to local govern­
ments , however —  and the state requirements and interpretations vary
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considerably.Perhaps, given the less abundant financial resources 
of local governments, a less rigorous environmental Impact assessment pro­
cess would be more appropriate. In any case, the fundamental "look before 
you leap" approach of environmental policy acts should be required of all 
decision-making levels.
Certain major actions of private entities —  such as large com­
mercial facilities (shopping centers, industrial parks, etc.), large sub­
divisions, and even rail spurs —  can escape NEPA’s anticipatory review. 
Often, on these projects, the only public review is the printing of corporate 
press releases in the newspapers. A NEPA-like review is just as important 
for private projects as it is for public actions and should be instituted.
3. Self-Policing
One of the most pressing difficulties in current NEPA practice 
is the uncertainty that agency decision-makers can ever police themselves 
effectively.After all, agencies write the environmental statements 
and make the final decisions. They have a stake in the development of 
budget-justifying projects. They have a well-documented tendency to be­
come captives of the very industries they are supposed to regulate.
And even well-intentioned experts within the agencies find it difficult 
to assert and maintain independence in the face of pressure from above —  
whatever the predictable impacts. How, then, are agencies to make good 
decisions?
Early in the history of NEPA a partial remedy to this difficulty 
was suggested. It was urged that CEQ be made an independent "ombudsman" 
with powers to enforce the act’s p r o v i s i o n s . A t  the federal level, 
nothing has come of that suggestion.
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New York state has established a Commissioner of Environmental 
Conservation empowered to initiate legal proceedings against public or 
private parties whose actions pose an imminent danger to the general wel­
fare or are likely to result in irreversible damage.
There are two problems with the New York "ombudsman" approach:
(l) Many environmentally damaging activities present long-term or cumula­
tive —  not imminent —  dangers. (2) Even the governmental ombudsman 
raises self-policing difficulties. Recognizing this, who can police the 
regulators? The Congressional oversight agency —  the General Accounting 
Office —  can raise hackles with its reports, but only the public can 
monitor compliance in a consistently independent fashion. Citizen enforce­
ment is a necessary complement to any sound environmental decision-making 
scheme. Citizen enforcement will not be an effective force unless the con­
cept of public trusts can be broadly applied and some important changes in 
citizen participation and judicial review can be made. (See below, Chapters 
9 and 10.)
h. Reactive Posture
Although it is not legally contemplated under NEPA, agencies 
typically decide on the general outlines of an action and then write an im­
pact statement to justify that action. In the course of the EIS writing, 
minor changes are made in the project; however, the basic decision was made 
in advance. The primary purpose of an EIS —  to serve as a decision-making 
guide —  is thwarted and the provisions of the law are subverted.
NEPA thus becomes a reactive, and watered-down impact assessment 
procedure. Its potential for anticipatory, positive planning is lost. In­
stead of using the general goals and procedures of the act to array and
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assess new and longer-range alternatives, the procedures are used simply 
to clear the way for preconceived projects.
To a certain extent, environmentalists have tried to compel a
more positive direction hy urging (and litigating for) comprehensive impact
251statements for entire programs. For example, instead of merely 
completing a statement on an individual coal lease, they demanded that 
the entire coal leasing program be reviewed. Or, even more broadly, they 
asked that the overall governmental and private effort to shift from 
eastern to western coal be assessed.
However, programmatic EISs released to date have been tindertaken
grudgingly and have been justifiably attacked. For example, the Department
of Interior's Federal Coal Lease Programmatic EIS was criticized by nearly
every agency of the federal government, numerous environmental groups, and
252the scientific community. The recommendation of nearly all reviewers —  
including senior officials in Interior —  was that a new draft EIS be issued. 
But then-Secretary of Interior Hathaway was apparently prepared to reject 
this advice and issue a final statement, thus hastening the further leasing 
of federal coal reserves in a manner subversive of NEPA.
High-quality programmatic EISs will probably help, but even they 
are no substitute for positive, independent planning.
An additional requirement of NEPA suggests a step toward positive
planning on a regular basis. Section 103 of the Act provides:
All agencies of the Federal Government shall re­
view their present statutory authority, administra­
tive regulations, and current policies and procedures 
for the purpose of determining whether there are any 
deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which pro­
hibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions 
of this Act and shall propose to the President not 
later than July 1, 1971, such measurers as may be 
necessary to bring their authority and policies into 
conformity with the intent, purposes, and procedures 
set forth in this A c t . ( E m p h a s i s  added)
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It has been Judicially determined that this language imposes a continuing 
duty on federal agencies —  not one that expired on July 1, 1971. Accord­
ingly, agencies must by this section constantly review continuously their 
regulations, policies, and procedures to assure full compliance with the 
purposes and goals of NEPA. However, no federal agency is rushing to comply. 
Unfortunately, pro forma statements remain the rule under this provision.
Agencies should be required —  within the range of their programs
and areas of jurisdiction —  to prepare comprehensive planning documents.
Full-scale citizen participation (as outlined below) and a detailed discussion
of alternative approaches would place the agencies in a positive, anticipatory
posture. In addition, it would permit a healthy debate on the overall
policies of an agency —  not simply a series of piecemeal squabbles on individual
agency.decisions.
C. NEPA and Economic Analysis
With today's languishing economy, it has become easier, more fashionable, 
and probably more legitimate to contrast environmental goals and economic ob­
jectives than it was during the "years of plenty." But, in doing so, it 
will not be sufficient to argue only that environmental protection is costly; 
for the pursuit of environmental quality yields very real economic benefits 
as v e i l . T h e  environment-econoigy controversy should consider these bene­
fits and should focus on the options for proper economic analysis under 
NEPA. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Instead, there have been sim­
plistic pleas for weakening of the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollu­
tion Control Act; roll-back of federal pollution and occupational health 
standards; and devitalizing changes in NEPA, among others.
At the same time, a drive has been mounted for enactment of narrow, 
specialized impact assessment procedures. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for 
example, has been pushing for state and federal-level economic impact statement
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requirements. Dr. Thomas Plaut recently suggested the preparation of 
people impact statements as a means to avoid "increased levels of politi­
cal alienation and violence in rapidly developing rural a r e a s . I n  
19T5, President Ford called for inflation impact statements, a call that 
vas not heeded by Congress. Nonetheless, the President’s Office of 
Management and Budget is preparing such statements in an ad hoc fashion.
While some advocates of these excessively specialized impact state­
ments are really attempting to overcome environmental considerations, the 
basic argument is sound —  that more than just environmental impacts 
should be studied when evaluating a project and that a more comprehensive 
planning framework is needed. However, adopting a series of discrete, un­
coordinated economic assessment procedures is not the answer. NEPA is 
the proper vehicle for an integrated examination of environmental and eco­
nomic impacts —  and a host of other variables.
Of course, some may wonder about the wisdom of including economic 
analysis in EISs. It can be argued that KEPA was designed to counterbalance 
the economic justification for projects with the ecological costs.
The thrust of the act gives additional weight to often-neglected environ­
mental problems occasioned by federal agency decisions. However, recent 
literature in economics demonstrates that these decisions can also yield 
numerous social and economic problems —  costs, distribution effects, job 
dislocations, etc.^^^ NEPA provisions evidence a general concern with these 
difficulties as well.
It could also be argued that economic variables, if used in a short­
sighted or narrow manner, could seriously blunt the effect of NEPA:^^”̂ 
superficial assertions of short-run dollar or employment benefits are always 
likely to carry the day unless the short- and long-range costs of disrupting
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the environment are thorou^ly evaluated and e x p o s e d .^58 Given the 
history of economic analysis —  a persistent "blindness to these long­
term costs —  there is good reason to he circumspect.
However, notwithstanding the risks, there appears no way to clean 
up some of the shoddier practices in conventional economics other than re­
quiring better economic analysis in the visible "action-forcing" context 
of KEPA. This, coupled with the developing work on the substantive re­
quirements of NEPA (treated previously), is the only promising avenue at
present.259
Federal agencies have a poor record for economic analysis in NEPA 
statements. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that NEPA, as noted 
previously, reads as a skeletal statute —  suggestive but very general. 
Matters of economic import receive little explicit attention.^^^
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidelines, adding meat to 
the act, refer to economic matters, but only briefly. The guidelines 
urge, for example, that agencies write statements on major actions that 
"significantly affect the quality of the human environment either by 
directly affecting human beings or by indirectly affecting human beings 
through adverse effects on the environment."^^1 (Emphasis added) Nowhere 
do IŒPA and the guidelines specify the type or depth of economic analysis 
required. But poor agency economic analysis cannot simply be blamed on 
NEPA vagueness. More likely, it is a failure of will— foragencies have 
attempted to ignore or circumvent even the most explicit NEPA provisions.
Further CEQ and agency initiative is essential, since the federal 
agencies' efforts to refine their economic analysis have been the result of 
citizen litigation or administrative appeals —  not a continuous and con­
scientious agency reading of NEPA or the guidelines.
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The Environmental Impact Assessment Project (a program of The 
Institute of Ecology) has reviewed impact statements on western coal 
development and criticized the responsible agencies for their failure 
adequately to assess the economic impacts of their proposals. Agency 
answers to the criticisms have typically "been indirect and ambiguous.
A federal interagency study of western coal development —  by the 
Northern Great Plains Resource Program —  was an attempt to assess some 
of the economic effects of coal development in the W e s t h o w e v e r ,  the 
study was mission-oriented and did not weigh the possibility that the econo­
mic costs of coal development taken as a whole would outweigh the benefits. 
Further, this study was not conducted pursuant to KEPA and did not reflect 
the act's mandate to examine alternatives.
Agency unwillingness to conduct thorough economic analysis has been 
assisted by recent court interpretations of NEPA. The act —  as construed 
by the courts in early cases —  seemed to require a "finely-tuned balancing 
analysis," "a case-by-case balancing judgment," a consideration of all fac-
265tors that would alter the cost-benefit ratio, and so forth. In short, 
it seemed to require very careful economic analysis. Since those cases, 
however, there have been additional challenges to agency cost-benefit analy­
ses, and the courts —  particularly federal district courts —  have shown 
increasing reluctance to demand the use of cost-benefit analysis and to re­
view EIS economic matters in detail,In-depth economic analysis has 
been called speculative and unnecessary. Also, legal scholars and economists 
do not universally agree that NEPA statements must contain full-scale econo­
mic analysis.
Federal agencies have grasped the opportunity. When citizen plain­
tiffs allege in court that an agency has conducted incomplete or erroneous
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economic studies, the agency almost invariably replies that the inadequacy 
of economic analysis is not a legally fatal defect. In essence, then, 
agencies can have it both ways. They can prepare casual economic analyses 
to bolster their proposals and then, when their economic assertions are 
legally challenged, they can simply ask "so what?"
The upshot is that federal agencies have largely avoided the use 
of sound economics in NEPA statements. A recent news analysis perhaps best 
summed up the current situation when it announced that the economic impacts 
of coal development were being ignored in EISs.^^® In that article (on 
the Westmoreland Coal EIS in southeastern Montana), a Ph.D. economist 
argued that the EIS had fulfilled NEPA requirements but he was not specific 
on the nature of. those requirements. The head of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs Planning Support Group, the agency that authored the NEPA state­
ment, argued that the EIS dealt only with the kind of information that could 
be "nailed down" and that to treat intangible costs would be like "gazing 
into a crystal ball." (Strangely enough, many agencies that are now 
"unable" to analyze "intangible costs" were, only a few years ago, using 
"intangible benefits" to boost cost-benefit ratios for favored projects.)
The quality of economic analysis in EISs can be improved in a variety 
of ways. One approach is to use the CEQ guidelines or an executive order 
to require agencies to develop detailed methods and checklists for the as­
sessment of economic costs and benefits. Since these methods could well 
vary substantially among the differing types of projects evaluated by a 
given agency, it would be best to allow different approaches for each major 
project type within an agency's jurisdiction. These methods could be sub­
ject to public review through the federal Administrative Procedures Act.
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During their development of consistent methods, federal agencies 
should review some of the new recommendations for jointly assessing en­
vironmental and economic costs and be n e f i t s . S o m e  of these —  such as 
Georgescu-Roegen’s net energy analysis —  do not simply rely upon dollars 
as the unit for comparing costs and benefits.
Mandating the use of so-called dialectical cost-benefit analysis is 
another possible approach. Dialectical analysis involves the simultaneous 
preparation of analyses by different parties for ultimate comparison. The 
action-forcing thrust of NEPA and the chance for agency fairness in cost- 
benefit analyses could be supplemented by encouraging the use of indepen­
dent , non-govemmental reviewers. Or, independent analyses could be 
funded by the lead agency and could be conducted by non-governmental enti­
ties. (This would be a first step toward the government paying for the 
benefits of an informed citizenry's participation and would encourage 
public dialogue on alternative economic methods.) The independent analysis 
could then be submitted as an alternative to the lead agency calculations 
and circulated for public and other agencies' review. In the NEPA process, 
the lead agency would then be required to contrast the two and show expli­
citly why it chose a particular set of costs and benefits.
Of course, the integration and relative weighting of environmental
and economic impacts identified in an EIS are crucial parts of NEPA decision­
making. Some of the most important evaluation —  tilting the decision
balance —  occurs at this time. If dialectical analysis were required,
each analyst could recommend the relative weight assigned to environmental 
versus economic factors. In the absence of dialectical analysis, a brief 
final decision document, together with complete agency files on decisions
made and comments received during the 30-day "cooling off" period would help.
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Either of these could permit a good deal more citizen participation in the 
now largely invisible evaluation of economic impacts.
An important substantive guideline revision would require that 
agencies base their decisions on computed economic and environmental com­
parisons, rather than merely disclose and consider adverse impacts.
In addition to the above, there are important distributional questions
272in the adoption of environmental safeguards. Environmentalists have 
been roundly —  and rightly —  critized for their general failure to con­
sider the adverse distribution effects of their environmental recommenda­
tions.^^^ There is very little in the popular environmental literature or 
movement programs that concerns itself with distributive equity.
It must be added, however, that very few groups of any kind are work­
ing on the close relationship between equitable distribution of the society's 
wealth and income and exploitation of the environment. Consider, for 
example, the proposed shift, now underway, to western coal as an energy 
so’rrce. Not only will the shift cause assive environmental disruptions, 
it will be one of the greatest exercises in wealth redistribution undertaken 
in chis country's history. Unmined coal is public wealth —  wealth that 
will be transferred to corporations and exploited at rates dictated by cor­
porate profit-loss accounts. The development is unlikely to result in a 
more equitable distribution of wealth or income, since there is heavy insti­
tutional investment in coal/energy conglomerates. While coal and energy 
companies stand to pocket billions of dollars in coal-generated wealth, low 
and middle income individuals will not receive a fair share.
Mining, timber harvesting, and nearly every other major resource activity 
has wealth and income distribution effects, impacts of the kind for which 
!tE?A was enacted. People must be told of distribution changes that will occur
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if the government approves a hard-rock mine, multi-year timber sale con­
tract, outer continental shelf oil lease, or other large development.
IVho will benefit and who will be harmed by extraction of a particu­
lar public resource? Or by protection of air and water quality, establish­
ment of a wilderness area, halting a subdivision on prime agricultural 
land? How much benefit or harm (in rough terms if necessary)? Are there 
alternatives that would minimize adverse distribution effects? These 
questions must be addressed if NEPA impact statements are really to dis­
cuss all the important impacts, of major governmental actions.
Any kind of proper economic analysis in forward-looking EISs will be 
impossible unless agencies receive sufficient economic planning data from 
corporations. Agencies are too often compelled by insufficient information 
to engage in speculative economic reckoning. One way to correct this was 
suggested by the National Employment Priorities Act introduced in 1971 by 
then-Senator Walter Mondale.^^^ Any business intending to close down or 
to transfer a certain percentage of its workers or operations would have to 
announce the action publicly. In doing so, the corporation would have to 
announce its reasons for closing, the amount of unemployment to be created, 
the economic condition of the business, and any plans to alleviate the 
employees* economic loss. Affected employees could then secure a govern­
mental investigation of the closure or transfer and a report on alternative 
courses of action. Just such transitional problems should be assessed in 
EISs.
Probably, to be effective, the requirements of NEPA should extend to 
other corporate plans, including decisions of multi-nationals to undertake 
operations overseas, especially since such corporate decisions are often 
followed by domestic closures. In general, the context of corporate decision-
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making should become a matter of anticipatory public scrutiny on both 
environmental and economic grounds.
Ultimately, the use of economic analysis consistent with NEPAs 
thrust will depend on progress in the following areas: environmental
litigation that prods courts to give serious consideration to the details 
of agencies’ economic analyses; agency hiring of resource-conscious 
economists able to conduct longer-run and more comprehensive analyses; 
public understanding of the hazards of pursuing short-run monetary re­
turns .
D. Conclusion
For all its weaknesses —  and they are both crucial and correctable —  
NEPA still forces agencies at least to consider and acknowledge adverse en­
vironmental and economic impacts. Even the efforts to circumvent the act 
can force agencies to modify ill-conceived plans or projects. More im­
portant , the act forces environmental evaluations public. Publicity
subjects them to review and criticism.
Kant rightly observed that publicity was exceedingly important as a 
block to arbitrariness in governmental decisions. To a certain extent,
NEPA provides this; but in each of the areas discussed above, the act could 
produce much more.
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Chapter 9
Citizen Participation
As the planet we live on "becomes more and more crowded, 
more wrinkled hy worries and complexities, more pressed 
hy needs, the earth's valuables increasingly have to 
he shared. The work of government as manager of the 
public's resources becomes one of its major tasks....
But the people have lost effective control over these 
decisions to the professional management of bureaucra­
cies. These structures, so largely independent of 
Congress, the President, and the courts, have a natural 
tendency to believe that they can decide for them­
selves. This attitude, that the experts 'know best,' 
is held by sincere and well-intentioned men... The 
great danger is that an entrenched professional 
bureaucracy will be shortsighted in its perception of 
the public good. It may see only the needs of the 
next decade when planning for a century is essential.
It may see only local demands when national needs 
demand consideration. It may see where immediate 
economic gain lies but fail to see the values of 'non­
economic' uses. It may prove unable to adapt to 
changes, to innovate, to create.
—  Charles A. Reich^??
Citizen participation in decisions affecting environmental quality 
has a long histoiry. Examples from the American past include a I69I town 
meeting in lynn, Massachusetts, where concern was expressed about cutting 
"or carrying away any wood or any part of the town's Commons," and about 
the proper restraint of pigs.^^^
Especially since the I96OS, however, citizen participation in environ­
mental decisions has become a point of major political concern. For many 
reasons, citizens are expressing redoubled insistence that they be included 
in the decisions that affect the quality of their environment and that of
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their children. Citizen participation, however, is not yet a fully effec­
tive force in environmental policies and decisions
The generalized insistence on citizen participation has relegated 
some all-important principles of participation to near-ohlivion; few stop 
to wonder what participation really acconçlishes and whether our particular 
"brand of citizen involvement is really participation. In essence, citizen 
participation is still too much a slogan without a corresponding substance.
Nowhere could this situation be more threatening than in the environ­
mental quality area. Increased citizen concern and action on environmental 
decisions has been a critical factor in balancing the typically short-run 
claims of public and private development interests with the claims of the 
larger public. The healthy public debate occasioned by this frequent clash 
has hei^tened the quality of environmental decisions (and if there is 
pessimism on that point in some cases, it can at least be said that citizen 
participation ranks as one of the country's most important continuing ed­
ucation programs). Strengthening citizen involvement is crucial to strength­
ening environmental protection.
A. Obstacles to Citizen Participation
The first difficulty confronting citizen participation is that it risks 
becoming mere citizen output. Typically, a governmental agency will hold a 
public gathering. (The term "gathering" is chosen because the agencies are 
not often clear whether they are conducting a formal public hearing; an in­
formational, "show me" meeting; or something even less defined.) If citizeis 
are permitted to speak, their remarks tend to be catharsis-inducing speeches 
more for the benefit of the audience than the decision-maker. Citizens pour 
out their knowledge, inclinations, biases, and values to no certain avail.
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Quite often, a written or taped record of the gathering is not kept.
Thus, the citizen effort can become simply output without measurable 
effect.
The second danger is that citizen participation will become mere 
input. Even if the responsible agency is clear on the purpose and for­
mat of its efforts to include citizens, and even if a record is kept, 
there are additional questions. Do the citizens actually get a chance 
to participate, to deliberate on the important questions at hand? Or do 
they merely supply comments?
Consider the difference between the two terms, input and participation. 
Input implies a distance from the decision-making for^m and suggests stand­
ing outside the deliberative arena. Participation, however, connotes an 
actual place in deliberations leading to the final decision. The term sug­
gests much more than such conventional approaches as letter writing, phone 
calls, informal visits, and testifying. Without some systematic exploration 
of this important difference, the promise of participation may well not 
materialize. In short, we need to decide whether we're going to establish 
genuine citizen participation or merely provide for citizen input.
A third problem with participation occurs after the citizen has gone 
home. Assuming the hearing is taken seriously by the agency, the decision­
maker sits down with a tape, transcript, letters, notes, or just personal 
recollections of the public comments and then undertakes what will always 
be the crucial and subjective act in environmental decisions: evaluating
the comments. How is it done? Are the other resource specialists involved
part of the evaluation? 
in making the final decision/ Are citizens able to participate in (or even
observe) this phase of the agency action?
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Currently, there exist no guidelines or standards —  aside from some 
U.S. Forest Service research recommendations —  for the evaluation of 
citizen participation.^®®
A fourth difficulty has been obvious for some time now, but few 
solutions have been offered. Individual citizens and groups are typical­
ly volunteer, low-budget operations.Citizens invest scarce time and 
money (while holding full-time jobs) with no expectation of direct personal 
returns. They travel to meetings, conferences, and hearings; write letters; 
make phone calls; obtain photocopies and documents —  all at personal ex­
pense.
These citizens are faced with increasingly complex, demanding, and, 
therefore, expensive issues and decisions in which they desire to partici­
pate intelligently. Agencies call upon them to participate in informational 
meetings, hearings, tours, and skull sessions (often involving out-of-town 
travel); these sessions do indeed provide needed background for informed 
participation. However, the citizen is expected to pay all costs associated 
with his participation (time off, travel, room and board) out of his own 
pocket. This is odd, since agencies readily agree that citizen participa­
tion benefits the public and helps agencies make better deicisions from a 
broader perspective. However, virtually no one is urging that the agencies 
pay for these benefits. Without some serious consideration of affirmative 
funding for citizen participation efforts, a decisive financial disincentive 
to participate will continue to exist. This disincentive will obstruct 
the depth to which citizen's can participate.
At first blush, it may sound ridiculous to propose the funding of citizen 
participation. Keep in mind, however, that businesses involved in such proceed­
ings very often retain attorneys, lobby, testify, travel, etc., and charge them
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as a business expense —  for which a tax deduction is later claimed. 
Ultimately, the consumers of their product or service pay for these ef­
forts. (When you "fill it up," you are buying the oil company's prime­
time television ads.) Thus, ve are already funding an extensive program of 
corporate participation. This is not to say that corporate lobbying is ille­
gitimate. The important point is that there is a clear imbalance between the 
ability of businesses and general citizens to finance their attempts at parti­
cipation.^®^ (See p. 131)
The major statute for citizen participation in resource decisions is 
the National Environmental Policy Act, outlined previously.^®® As noted, 
participation in the environmental impact statement procedures of NEPA yields 
mixed results.
Numerous other federal statutes contain important procedures for citizen 
participation. Foremost among these is the Administrative Procedures Act, 
adopted in an effort to regularize the procedures of the vast federal bureau­
cracy.^®^ Citizen participation procedures are also found in the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, the Clean Air Act, the Technology Assessment Act, 
the Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act, and/or the regulations 
adopted under them.
The literature on these statutes is substantial and need not be examined 
here.^®^ Although a number of important changes could be made in each, the 
overriding difficulties with citizen participation will not be corrected 
simply by tinkering with these laws. We must undertake a more fundamental 
approach to strengthening public life in America. Below, some likely 
initial approached are reviewed.
B. New Avenues for Citizen Participation
Constituting the public as beneficiary under the public trust approach
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vould be a giant step toward more effective citizen participation —
particularly in the judicial branch of government. There are a number
of other directions that should be explored.
Advisory councils and citizen "ombudsmen"^®^ are frequently-mentioned
alternatives for increased citizen participation. Both can be quite help- 
288ful and, unless arbitrarily structured or operated, should be employed. 
However, neither of these approaches significantly broadens direct citizen 
participation.We must look at other ways to promote effective citizen 
participation in federal and state environmental decision-making.
1. Open Information and Decision-making
It has been a long-standing cornerstone of democratic theory that
governmental activities at all levels should be public. This openness in
government is the prerequisite of informed scrutiny and criticism of govern­
mental activity. Section 39 of the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of I6&I 
provided;
Every Inhabitant of the Country shall have free 
libertie to search and veewe any Rooles, Re­
cords, or Regesters of any Court or office ex­
cept the Councell, And to have a transcript or
exemplification thereof written examined, and 
signed by the hand of the officer or the of­
fice on paying the appointed fees therefore.[sic]290
Commenting on this principle more than a hundred years later, 
Patrick Henry said that "...the liberties of a people never were, nor 
ever will be, secure when the transactions of their rulers may be con­
cealed from them...."^91
James Madison spoke to the same point in an 1822 letter:
A popular Government without popular informa­
tion, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
17-
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Prologue to a Farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps 
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance:
And the people who mean to be their own Gover­
nors, must arm t^gj^selves with the power which 
knowledge gives.
Thomas Jefferson also wrote on this principle, saying”...the basis of 
our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object 
should be to keep that right.... The way to prevent [errors of] the 
people is to give them full information of their affairs. ..."^93
Secrecy in government has become a burning national issue in 
the face of Watergate, executive privilege, illegal CIA activities, and a 
variety of foreign policy debates.
In 1966, Congress enacted the federal Freedom of Information Act 
(FOI).^^^ Althou^ the act was expressly designed to force governmental 
disclosure, its exemptions were soon used by agencies to withhold vast 
amounts of information.
Recent amendments to the FOI Act have oriented the statute to­
ward even greater disclosure.Congress recently enacted a federal sun­
shine statute and a number of states have followed suit.̂ ^6a Although 
these vary considerably, they do not generally provide the following impor­
tant features :
a. A requirement that agencies develop consistent filing methods 
and make available their file indices to facilitate file searches.
b. A requirement that all agencies file in a central depository 
their decisions denying access to any file and/or meeting, together with 
the reasons for denial.
c. A central entity to oversee the implementation of the sunshine 
statute and to adopt regulations or issue binding opinions on the act.^^7
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d. A requirement that photocopies be made available at cost; 
or, in the case of non-profit, public interest groups, that copies be 
made free.^^®
e. Affirmative requirements that agencies give timely notice
of important decision-making sessions or, equally important, that agencies 
provide early notification that a particular decision-making process is 
about to begin.
f. A provision that awards attorney fees to groups incorrectly 
denied access to information or meetings.
A number of further embellishments could be recommended. How­
ever, it is important to note that the public's rights of openness and 
access are only the prerequisites, not the substance of genuine participa­
tion.
2. Participatory Decision-making Sessions
As was argued, citizen observation or input are not the same 
as citizen participation. If hearings are properly announced, citizens 
can provide input. If decision-making sessions are announced in a 
timely fashion, citizens will be able to observe the deliberations. Al­
though these are important steps, neither assures that citizens can actual­
ly participate.
Consider the possibility of structuring genuinely participatory 
decision-making sessions. After public hearings, comments, and other pro­
cedural steps are taken, the divergent interests could actually join the 
agency decision-makers at the deliberation table. Each interest could 
recapitulate its case; a debate could be conducted; the agency could pub­
licly assess the arguments; and a decision could be made.
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No doubt, the ultimate decision-making responsibility —  under 
present statutes —  would have to remain with the agency officials. How­
ever, requiring that these decisions be made after participatory decision­
making sessions and that they be reduced to reviewable, written findings 
of fact and Judgments could change the political context of agency deci­
sion-making enormously. It would be less likely that inter-personnel 
pressures or superiors' biases would guide discussions or shape final 
decisions. The ultimate basis for an agency decision would be immediate­
ly and expressly available, and citizens would have a much clearer oppor­
tunity to judge the merits of a particular decision.
3. Direct Funding of Citizen Involvement
The above changes would improve the quality of citizen partici­
pation, but they do not address the problem of unequal financial backing of 
corporations and citizens.
As was argued above, it is routine for large business enterprises 
to hire lobbyists, retain attorneys, travel, attend meetings, etc. —  in 
short, to Hake a continuing presence with regulatory agencies. Judging 
from the regulatory meekness of federal agencies, the businesses are mod­
erately successful. As was also pointed out, these business expenses 
are ultimately paid for by the consumer and taxpayer.
The large, unorganized public does not have a corporate treasury
to draw upon and, with a few notable exceptions, can not afford full­
time representation.
A recent study of citizen volunteer groups —  conducted by the 
National Center for Voluntary Action (NCVA) —  makes the point very clear. 
Over half of the citizen environmental groups in the United States have 
annual budgets smaller than $2,000. Nearly half have no office space,
clerical assistance or office equipment.30^
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The NCVA study recommended a number of steps to increase the 
financial resources of citizen groups. It noted the obvious disparity 
betveen businesses vhich can lobby and deduct their expenses, and citi­
zen groups vhich cannot do so. NCVA recommended that "all reasonable 
expenses incurred by a private citizen to advise a legislative or admin­
istrative body (or its members or employees) of the citizen's vie vs 
respecting any legislative proposals should be a deductible expense... 
provided that a maximum dollar amount is imposed on the total amount to 
be d e d u c t i b l e . T h e  study also recommended that contributions made 
to citizen lobby groups should be deductible.
Surprisingly, the NCVA did not make recommendations concerning 
direct funding of citizen groups —  beyond a general urging that philan­
thropists, corporations, and foundations should give greater financial 
support to citizen volunteers.
Hazel Henderson, a board member of the Council on Economic 
Priorities and the Public Interest Economics Center, has vritten briefly 
about some of the options for direct funding of participation. The prac­
tice is considerably more widespread than might be assumed. In Sweden, 
for example, the government frequently makes grants to citizen groups. 
These monies are used to insure that the citizen viewpoint is presented.
In Canada, government provides "intervenor funding" to key participants. 
Recently, an inquiry was conducted on the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline in 
which $600,000 was provided to citizen intervenors: $U00,000 to Native
and Indian groups, and $200,000 to citizen environmental groups.
In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has taken some halting steps toward citizen funding. Recently, for 
example, EPA secured an appropriation for water quality training sessions,
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The money was used for educational institutes on citizen implementation 
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972. The act is very com­
plex and the educational program was a wise step. However, once having 
been deluged with information about the act and its potential, citizens 
were sent home to implement the act on their own. Little additional 
funding for citizen implementation or enforcement is available. In short, 
the EPA effort fell far short of its potential.
There are several other private efforts underway in this area.
For example, the National Council for the Public Assessment of Technology 
has helped the Office of Technology Assessment to recruit paid citizen con­
sultants who provide important social data in technology assessments^ The 
Public Interest Economics Center, through a matching program, has provided 
expert assistance to citizen groups (a kind of advocacy science).
One of the most encouraging signs of increased attention to 
funding citizen participation is Senator Kennedy's 1976 proposal authoriz­
ing administrative intervenor assistance.Compensation would be pro­
vided to intervenors who could represent important interests which 
contribute substantially to the particular proceeding. As it stands, the 
act does not seem to allow compensation for participation under NEPA.
Kennedy is also considering use of "citizen assessment bonds." 
Proceeds from the bonds could defray a variety of citizen participation 
expenses. Bonds are a favored method to raise money for important public 
projects. With the citizen assessment bond approach, citizen participa­
tion would be treated as an important public project. In addition, the 
legislation will deal with the possibility of reimbursing citizen groups 
which provide substantial input for legislative or administrative proceed­
ings.
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Nobel prize-winning economist Gunnar lardai pointed out some 
time ago that citizen groups could perform a variety of tasks now rele­
gated to governmental bureaucracies —  and could perform them more 
effectively and less expensively,^®*^ We need to take his compelling 
point seriously and undertake the direct funding of citizen action.
k. Attorney Fees and Costs Awards
Citizen groups have difficulty keeping up with the continuing 
rush and financial demands of legislative sessions and administrative 
proceedings.^®^ When it comes to the judicial branch of government how­
ever, the problem is especially severe. Obtaining good legal research 
on a particular legal issue can easily cost several hundred dollars. Em­
ploying an attorney for representation or assistance in a complex admin­
istrative proceeding can cost thousands. Engaging in full-scale litigation 
in federal courts can quickly run to six figures. It is difficult if not 
impossible for citizen groups to raise the money necessary for persistent 
legal action.
The courts are often the last resort for enforcing statutes or 
agency regulations and they are an important part of the environmental 
arsenal. As a result, citizen groups today are often reduced to the choice 
of seeking free legal help (akin to looking for free food) or abdicating 
important remedies.
Until recently, however, federal courts frequently awarded 
attorney fees and costs to citizen litigants. In Hall v. Cole, the United 
States Supreme Court held that federal courts, in the exercise of their 
equitable powers, "may award attorney fees when the interests of Justice 
so require."309 Following this lead, numerous courts have awarded
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attorney fees (l) when a suit resulted in substantial public benefits
or benefits to a class of individuals; (2) when the suit enforced a
strong and clear Congressional policy; or (3) when the court felt it
necessary to lift a financial burden that impeded private enforcement 
110of the laws. In essence, the courts tended to award attorney fees
where citizen groups filed suit to ensure the proper functioning of 
government and enforcement of the laws.
What is surprising is that a recent United States Supreme 
Court case wipes out this persuasive logic. The court has now ruled 
that Congress, not federal courts, has the authority to provide for the 
awarding of attorney fees to public interest litigants. In a well- 
reasoned dissent,Justice liarshall argued that the courts should be 
able to award attorney fees when citizen litigants sue to enforce 
Congressional policy or to protect important public interests.
According to the Council for Public Interest Law, the 
Supreme Court’s decision severly injured some public interest cases 
and firms: "Millions of dollars of anticipated fee awards have been
lost. Major cases have had to be curtailed. New cases have had to 
be turned down. One public interest law firm was even forced to sharp­
ly cut back its operations...."312
Following the pre'ent Supreme Court ruling, it appears that 
attorney fees and court costs will be awarded only under those environ­
mental statutes where Congress has specifically authorized such awards.
For example, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act specifically
rard
314
111authorizes courts to awa  costs of litigation. Ihe Clean Air Act
and others do the same.
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Either through judicial reconsideration or Congressional enact­
ment, the general availability of attorney fees and court costs should 
be affirmed. Environmental litigation is a legitimate use of the third 
branch of government and should not be so burdensome to the citizen.
5. Citizen Enforcement
Another approach to encouraging —  and perhaps funding —  
citizen enforcement proceedings is the monetary reward for conducting 
successful enforcement actions.
Section 13 of the Refuse Act of 1899 provides that it is 
illegal to discharge refuse matter into navigable waters or their tri­
butaries without a permit. Upon conviction for violation, the section 
stipulates that the fine is set between $500 and $2,500, "...one half 
of the said fine to be paid to the person or persons giving information 
which shall lead to conviction.
Although this kind of statute has not been very popular lately 
among legislatures, it would add an important incentive for citizen en­
forcement of environmental laws.
6. Citizen Involvement in the Corporation
As discussed previously, one of the key failures of the 
National Environmental Policy Act is that its requirements directly 
cover only the federal agencies. Numerous private sector activities 
are not publicly reviewed in a healthy fashion.
Apart from the question whether some sectors of the economy 
might best be publicly owned,there is a strong argument that 
citizens must be able to participate in major corporate decisions. At 
present, citizens often are impacted more directly by corporate decisions 
than governmental actions.
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Althou^ involvement of one sort or another in government deci­
sions is quite common, citizen participation in the decisions of major 
corporations is virtually nonexistent. It should become commonplace. 
Typically, a corporation announces its development plans; holds one or 
a few informational meetings; complies with (or obtains a variance from) 
applicable federal, state, and local requirements; and then proceeds 
with construction.
A sizeable and growing body of literature reveals the in­
capacity of society to control corporate b e h a v i o r . E v e n  conventional 
economic texts now hold that shareholders can no longer control corporate 
a c t i v i t i e s w h i l e  boards of directors have been criticized for their 
lax involvement in corporate affairs; the tendency of federal agencies 
to assume the interests of the corporations they supposedly regulate 
has been widely n o t e d ; t h e  weakness of states in the face of large 
corporations is a matter of r e c o r d a n d  labor unions assert their 
power generally only in the areas of wages, benefits, and working condi­
tions. In sum, there is no decisive institutional check on the decision­
making of corporate managers.
It seems, then, that only the active citizen, if anyone, is in 
a position to influence corporate decisions —  particularly the citizen 
affected by those decisions. However, to attempt this with a fair chance 
of success, he’ll need some institutional back-up. Some of the most 
commonly proposed aids are :
a. Corporations could be required to replace some of their pro­
duct or image advertising with expenditures for the conduct of public 
hearings. Instead of telling citizens what they should buy, corporations 
should ask citizens what they need.
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b. In order for citizens to grasp more fully the dimensions 
and activities of major corporations, greater disclosure requirements are 
needed. Citizens need to know, for exangle, the environmental activities 
of corporations in other states, the size of the advertising budget, the 
size of the research and development budget (broken down so routine test­
ing is not stuffed in to inflate the amount), the quantity and type of 
emissions and effluents, the nature of pending litigation or enforcement 
actions against or by the corporation, and so on.
c. The right of employees to speak out without fear of reprisal 
should be guaranteed so that citizens can benefit from the insights of 
insiders.
d. The public should have representatives on the corporation's 
board of directors, if not within management itself.
e. The public should have greater control oyer the activities 
of hired guns (particularly environmental consultants) who are sometimes 
employed not only to analyze relevant environmental data, but also to 
assuage the corporate conscience or to overcome legitimate public con­
cerns.
f. A number of other options should be considered: stiffer 
penalties for corporate violations of laws, including the suspension of 
guilty executives; in-house corporate ombudsmen; greater access to 
corporate records ; stricter incorporation standards ; the creation of 
citizen advisory councils on corporate policy; structuring public de­
bates on corporate policy; and refining the practices of social (rather 
than just profit-loss) accounting for corporations.
Of course, this list could be lengthened, and the debates on 
public ownership should continue. The point is that citizens have long
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sought to participate in all decisions which influence the quality of 
their lives. Now, we must turn our attention to the large corporation —  
an entity granted limited liability, certain civil liberties, and a 
number of tax incentives by the state, and an entity whose products (and 
advertising) we buy. If effective citizen participation in corporate 
decisions is not achieved, political democracy and republicanism will 
become increasingly pointless.323
7. Conclusion
Ultimately, as noted by a number of authors, our entire struc­
ture of public life needs revamping. Establishing the preconditions 
for this effort will require changes along the lines outlined above.
In general, we should be more cautious that, in exchange for 
rapid increases in consumption and devotion to essentially private acti­
vities, we do not preempt the chance for citizens to participate in 
decisions affecting their lives, their children's lives, and the lives 
of future generations.
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Chapter 10
Strengthening Judicial Review 
and Other Changes
Although the previous discussion of the public trust doctrine, NEPA, 
and citizen participation covered the major necessary changes in environ­
ment-related institutions, several other innovations are needed if life- 
support systems and a desirable human habitat are. to be protected.
A. S tren g th en in g  Ju d ic ia l  Review
Expense is not the only difficulty encountered by citizen groups in 
courts. It is now considerably easier for citizen groups to gain admit­
tance to court. The law of "standing” —  which determines whether a party 
is sufficiently affected to file suit —  has been liberalized substantial­
ly.32^ However, it is equally important that citizens be able to accom­
plish something once they get into court. This can occur only if courts 
will undertake a probing review of the agency’s challenged action —  pro- 
cedurally and substantively. The courts have shown some tendency toward 
stricter review of agency action.
One important way to restrict the excessive discretion of adminis­
trative agencies is to augment the role of the courts in reviewing agency 
decisions. Of course, the public trust approach would accomplish this 
to a great extent. Several additional steps are required, however.
Currently, the federal Administrative Procedures Act specifies a 
number of review standards. The one most commonly applied permits courts
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to reverse agency actions if the action was ’’...arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."^^^
In general, the courts will not substitute their judgment for that of 
the a g e n c y ; 326 the matter often rests on whether the agency exer­
cised "reasoned discretion"32? or committed a "clear error of judg­
ment.
What do these careful but ambiguous phrases amount to? In prac­
tice, they provide substantial protection for agency discretion. They 
make it quite difficult for citizen groups —  or anyone else —  success­
fully to challenge agency decisions.
In some circumstances, a stricter standard can be applied. When 
reviewing an agency rule under the Administrative Procedures Act or an 
agency action taken after public adjudicatory hearing, the "substantial 
evidence" test is used. In this instance, the court will determine 
whether the agency decision is supported by "substantial evidence." If 
not, the decision can be reversed.
Some court decisions lean toward an even stricter standard and, con­
sequently a strong judicial presence. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke, the 
court held that the agency’s decision "...is entitled to a presumption 
of regularity, although the presumption is not to shield...action from 
a thorough, probing, and in-depth review." (Emphasis added) The court 
applied what is called the "substantial inquiry" test.
This kind of review places a heavier burden on agencies to demon­
strate that there has been a genuine and not a perfunctory compliance 
with NEPA.
Since the courts are often the only way to a bureaucrat's heart, the 
stringency of judicial review is crucial. It is unlikely that the stricter
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approach is amenable to a statutory resolution, but continued attorney 
briefing before the courts on the need for probing review will be 
necessary.
Although a recent analysis suggests that all this may be purely a 
matter of s e m a t i c s ,330 it is the case that the posture of the courts on 
the question of agency reveiw will remain an important factor in the 
success or failure of environmental lawsuits.
B. Changing the Burdens of Persuasion and Proof
Events of the recent past have dramatically underscored the need 
to reexamine the traditional legal rules of proof and persuasion. One 
of the functions of the law is to assign responsibility and provide re­
lief for potential or realized harms. In certain environmental and 
public health disputes —  particularly carcinogenic and other toxic 
substances — this task is difficult. The prospects are too serious 
to ignore, however.
Throu^out the mid-1970s, there has been alarming news on the cancer- 
inducing and toxic effects of numerous substances. Many of these —  food 
additives, pesticides, air pollutants, hormones, etc. —  are routine parts 
of daily life. These and other environmental factors are now thou^t to 
be the cause for 60-90 percent of all cancers in the U.S.
This news has led to a barrage of studies, condicted by federal, 
private, and industrial groups. There has been renewed attention to the 
enactment of toxic substances legislation and new product regulations, of 
varying efficacy, have been adopted.
Even if strides are taken in research studies and new legislation, 
however, a deeper problem will persist: it is legally difficult to challenge
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production and marketing of hazardous substances due to the excessive 
proof and persuasion requirements involved.
The Reserve Mining case illustrates the d i l e m m a . T h e  company 
vas dumping 69,000 tons of ashestos-fihered taconite each day into 
Lake Superior, which is the water supply for Duluth and other towns.
Asbestos as an air pollutant is known to cause cancer in humans ; how­
ever, similar studies have not proven its carcinogenicity as a water 
pollutant. Thus, parties challenging the taconite effluent were unable 
to meet the test of demonstrable health hazards and the dumping continued.
This dilemma becomes horrifying when it is realized that this type 
of proof-standard effectively leaves hazardous products on the market 
until adverse —  even fatal —  health effects show up.
One corrective step is to shift the burden of proof by allowing 
administrative banning of a suspect product, subject to proof in court 
by the producer that the product is safe. Such a move would require ag­
grieved industries to present'their case and carry the burden to establish 
the safety of their p r o d u c t . ( A l s o  see discussion above of Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act, p. 77-)
■ However, much more is required. Absolute proof of the health hazards 
of many chemicals is available only if we use humans as experimental animals 
for twenty years and then conduct computer analyses on autopsy reports. The 
only entities protected by this approach are the corporate profit, graph and 
an abusively vague notion of free enterprise.
The most promising avenue is to structure a screening procedure that 
prevents potentially harmful products from being marketed. However, since 
any procedure will involve discretion, error, and abuse, it is also imperative 
to reduce the burden of persuasion and allow a shift of the proof burden in
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public health litigation. There are some trends in this direction.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court has held that EPA may regulate 
emissions that "...will endanger public health or w e l f a r e . "333 Making 
this determination "...does not require proof of actual harm.... Within 
reasonable limits, danger is the product of magnitude of risk and magni­
tude of potential harm."33^ (Emphasis added)
The trend toward altered standards of persuasion and proof in public 
health cases should continue. Otherwise, the law will paint itself into 
a corner on some of the most crucial questions of product safety and, ul­
timately, public health.
C. Promoting Cultural Diversity
Congress has shown some interest in protecting a variety of histori­
cal and cultural r e s o u r c e s . 335 primary concern of efforts such as the
Antiquities Act is to protect the historical record —  to protect the past 
evidence of the human past. The statutes and regulations designed for this 
purpose are only partially successful. Many more projects are preceded by 
archaeological investigations (although it is becoming increasingly diffi­
cult to find archaeologists willing to testify against the National Park 
Service now that NPS can award lucrative and coveted contracts for pre- 
project archaeological research).
Protecting cultural resources is surely a laudable goal. It is im­
portant to know of the past —  its richness and diversity, and the often 
harsh lessons learned by earlier generations. The value of culture does 
not stop there, however. It is not confined to human artifacts. It is 
not simply a thing of the past.
In recent years it has been acknowledged that ecological diversity is
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importEint for overall ecosystem health and stability. Resorting to
monoculture, or otherwise undermining the natural diversity of ecosystems 
always poses the threat of increased susceptibility of the ecosystem to 
disease and degradation.
Virtually the same can be said of diversity in human cultures. The 
various cultures that have inhabited the planet have held differing world 
views and, more particularly, divergent approaches to nature.
For example, numerous signs of Indian reverence for the land can be
found in Indian oratory. One of the most famous is the l8$^ speech of
Chief Seathl of the Duwamish tribe:
Every part of this soil is sacred in the estimation 
of my people. Every hillside, every valley, every 
plain and grove, has been hallowed by some sad or 
happy event in days long vanished. The very dust 
upon which you now stand responds more lovingly to 
their footsteps than to yours, because it is rich 
with the blood of our ancestors and our bare feet 
are conscious of the sympathetic touch.337
And a Vintu holy woman once spoke harshly of the lack of American
respect for the land:
The white people never cared for land or deer or 
bear. When we Indians kill meat, we eat it all 
up. When we dig roots we make little holes.
When we built houses, we make little holes.
When we burn grass for grasshoppers, we don’t 
ruin things. We shake down acoms and pinenuts.
We don't chop down the trees. We only use dead 
wood. But the White people plow up the ground, 
pull down the trees, kill everything. The tree 
says, 'Don't. I am sore. Don't hurt me.' But 
they chop it down and cut it up. The spirit of 
the land hates them. They blast our trees and 
stir it up to its depth. They saw up the trees.
That hurts them. The Indians never hurt any­
thing, but the White people destroy all. They 
blast rocks and scatter them on the ground.
The rock says, 'Don't. You are hurting me.'
But the White people pay no attention. When 
the Indians use rocks, they take little round
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ones for their cooking.,.. How can the spirit 
of the earth like the White man?... Everywhere 
the White man has touched it, it is s o r e .338
The value of these differences is ohvious. They fertilize the 
mind, demonstrating that one culture's long-developing traditions and 
outlook do not define the limits of human consciousness. They hi^- 
light alternative approaches to the environment. They suggest new ways 
of conducting human activities on the earth.
The "melting pot" approach to these differences is, in the long run, 
self-destructive. It reduces genuine and valuable differences and pro­
duces homogeneity —  a monotonous and blind similitude of human living.
Alternative value systems should have a constitutionally guaranteed 
existence. They should be protected from destruction. More importantly, 
we should affirmatively promote cultural diversity. The various tribal, 
religious sect, and counter-cultural approaches —  such as communal sharing 
of major structures, appliances, and land —  should receive attention. We 
should fund alternative cultural experiments, particularly those which pro­
mote low-energy lifestyles, less consumptive leisure, and so o n .^39
Assuming that our present cultural approach is the best or only one 
is patently dangerous to the natural world and to man as a component.
D. Defining the Essentials for a Quality Life
Hand-in-hand with the protection of cultural diversity, we must begin 
to identify, in public discussion and dialogue, what is really essential for a 
quality life. One of the best ways to protect the environment —  and to pro­
mote economic stability —  is to reduce our demands and expectations. This 
is true because most of the uses to which we put various aspects of the 
environment have an adverse impact, either by reducing ecological diversity.
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overcoming ecological assimilation capacities, or breaking ecological 
linkages. A solid solution is to reduce the consumption of nonessentials 
and eliminate the production of essential items by wasteful means.
We should begin a nationwide dialogue on the genuine essentials for 
a quality life —  a painstaking, public sorting of our routine consuzẑ tion 
priorities. We should expose sizeable portions of present-day consunçztion 
that are unnecessary, frivolous, or even dangerous. We could then begin 
to scale down or abolish the production and consumption of such goods or 
services.
Of course, attempting this planned reduction leads to a tough dis­
tinction between needs an 1 wants. No matter how difficult it is to achieve, 
the promise of the distinction should not be ignored.
Aristotle's famous dictum "It is not so important to live as it is to 
live well" can be rephrased slightly: It is not so important to consume
as it is to consume wisely. If we cannot make some strides in distinguish­
ing between essential and nonessential consumption, we admit that hopeless 
confinement to passage on a rudderless ship is preferable to facing the 
realities of a depleted planet and steering our course to avoid them.
E. Anticipating Transitional Difficulties
No doubt, some of the transitional problems in implementing the above 
changes will be vexing. But numerous transitional difficulties can be ex­
pected whether these changes are made or not. Major shifts in the structure 
and production of the economy are in progress. These shifts will result in 
sizeable economic dislocations —  loss of jobs and income, skyrocketing 
prices, not to mention environmental disruption.
As a nation, we have shown pathetically little competence in antici­
pating or softening such changes. Our capacity to make transitions in the
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economy is nowhere clearly established. How do we make basic economy 
changes? How can we mitigate the effects of recession and reduced 
demand?
A continued neglect of this subject will produce undue hardship 
and could well reduce the prospects for needed or desirable change.
A federal-level commitment to making needed change while softening its 
adverse impacts is imperative. Perhaps an Office of Transition or a 
beefed-up Office of Technology Assessment would be able to start such 
an effort. But to avoid misconception: merely creating another federal
office will not drive away the malady. Decentralized understanding and 
promotion of needed social and economic change will be crucial to ulti­
mate success. Without such understanding, the horror of Norman Mailer 
could well be the prospect of the future:
...the storm approaches its thunderhead, and it is 
apparent that the boat drifts ever closer to the 
shore. So the blind will lead the blind, and the 
deaf shout warnings to one another until their 
voices are lost.3 ^
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APPENDIX A
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
PQLICY ACT OF 1969, AS AMENDED*
An Act to establbh a national policy for the environment, to provide for 
the eitablbhm ent of a  Council on Environmental Q uality, and for other 
purposes.
B * i t  tn a c ttd  by the Senate and  House o f Representatives o f the U n ited  
S ta te i o f Am erica  in  Congress assembled. T h a t this A ct may be cited as the 
"National Environmental Policy Act of 1959."
PURPOSE
Sec. 2. T h e  purposes of this A ct are: T o  declare a national policy which 
w ill encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his 
environment; to promote efforts which w ill prevent or eliminate damage 
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare 
of m an; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural 
resources important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environ­
mental Q uality.
TITLE I
DECLARATION OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Sec. 101. (a )  The Congress, recogniâng the profound impact of man's 
activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, 
particularly the profound influences o f population growth, high density urban­
ization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding 
technological advances and recognizing further the critical importance of 
restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and 
development of man, declares that i t  is the continuing policy of the Federal 
Government, in  cooperation w ith State and local governments, and other 
concerned public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and 
measures, including financial and technical assistance, in  a manner calculated 
to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in  productive harmony, and fu lfill 
the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future genera­
tions of Americans.
(b ) In  order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, i t  is the con­
tinuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, 
consistent w ith other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
*Pub. L . 91 -190 , 42 U .S .C . 4321 -4347 . January 1, 1970, as amended by 
Pub. L . 9 4 -8 3 , August 9 ,1 975 .
(Source: Council on Environmental Quality, Sixth
Annual Report, pp. 68I-685, Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
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and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the 
end that the Nation may—
(1 )  Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations;
(2 )  Assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and csthcti- 
cally and culturally pleasuring surroundings;
(3 )  A ttain  the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment 
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and 
unintended consequences;
(4 )  Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of 
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment 
which supports diversity, and variety of individual choice;
(5 )  Achieve a balance between population and resource use which 
w ill perm it high standards of living and a  wide sharing of life's 
amenities; and
(6 )  Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c ) T h e  Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful 
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the 
preservation and enhancement of the environment.
■ Sec. 102. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent 
possible: ( ! )  the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States 
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth 
in this Act, and (2 )  all agencies of the Federal Government shall—
(A )  U tilize  a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure 
the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environ­
mental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have 
an impact on man’s environment;
(B ) Identify  and develop methods and procedures, in consultation 
w ith the Council on Environmental Q uality  established by title I I  of 
this Act, which w ill insure that presently unquantified environmental 
amenities and values may be given appropirate consideration in decision­
making along w ith economic and technical considerations;
(C )  Include in  every recommendation or report on proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the respon­
sible official on—
( i )  T h e  environmental impact of the proposed action,
( i i )  Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented,
( i i i )  Alternatives to the proposed action,
( iv )  T h e  relationship between local short-term uses of man's 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term  
productivity, and
(v )  Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should i t  be 
implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official 
shall consult w ith  and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which 
has jurisdiction by law or special expertise w ith  respect to any environ­
mental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and 
views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are 
authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made 
avmlable to the President, the Council on Environmental Q uality and to 
the public as provided by section 552 of title 5, United States Code, 
and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review 
processes;
( D )  Any detailed statement required under subparagraph (C ) after 
January I ,  1970, for any m ajor Federal action funded under a program
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of grants to States shall not be deemed to be legally insufBcient solely 
by reason of having been prepared by a State agency or official, if  :
( i )  the State agency or official has statewide jurisdiction and 
has the responsibility for such action,
( i i )  the responsible Federal official furnishes guidance and par­
ticipates in such preparation,
( i i i )  the responsible Federal official independently evaluates such 
statement p rior to its approval and adt^tion, and
(iv )  after January 1, 1976, the responsible Federal official pro­
vides early notification to, and solicits the views of, any other State 
o r any Federal land management entity of any action or any alterna­
tive thereto which may have significant impacts upon such State or 
affected Federal land management entity and, if there is any dis­
agreement on such impacts, prepares a written assessment of such 
impacts and views for incorporation into such detailed statemenL
T he procedures in this subparagraph shall not relieve the Federal official 
of his responsibilities for the scope, objectivity, and content of the entire 
statement or of any other responsibility under this Act; and further, this 
subparagraph does not affect the legal sufficiency o f statements prepared 
by State agencies with less than statewide jurisdiction.
( E )  Study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recom­
mended courses of action in  any proposal which involves unresolved 
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources;
(F )  Recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environ­
mental problems and, where consistent with the foreigrx policy of the 
U nited  States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and 
programs designed to maximize International cooperation in anticipating 
and preventing a  decline in the quality of mankind’s world environment;
(G )  M ake available to States, counties, municipalities, institutions, 
and individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, 
and enhancing the quality of the environment;
( H )  In itia te  and utilize ecological information in the planning and 
development of resource-oriented projects; and
( I )  Assist the Council on Environmental Q uality  established by title 
I I  of this Act.
Sec. 103. A ll agencies of the Federal Government shall review their 
present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies 
and procedures for the purpose of determining whether there are any deficien­
cies or Inconsistencies therein which prohibit fu ll compliance with the purposes 
and provisions of this Act and shall propose to the President not later than 
July 1, 1971, such measures as may be necessary to bring their authority and 
policies into conformity w ith the intent, purposes, and procedures set forth in 
this A c t
Sec. 104. Nothing in section 102 or 103 shall in  any way affect the specific 
statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1 )  to comply w ith criteria or 
standards of environmental quality, (2 )  to coordinate or consult w ith  any 
other Federal or State agency, or ( 3 )  to act, or refrain from acting'contin­
gent upon the recommendations or certification of any other Federal or State 
agency.
Sec. 105. T h e  policies and goals set forth In this Act are supplementary 
to those set forth in existing authorizations of Federal agencies.
TITLE II
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Sec. 201. The President shall transmit to the Congress annually beginning 
July 1, 1970, an Environmental Q ua lity  Report (hereinafter referred to as
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the "report” ) which shall set forth ( I )  the status and condition of the major 
natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes of the Nation, including, 
but not lim ited to, the air, the aquatic, including marine, estuarine, and fresh 
water, and the terrestrial environment, including, but not limited to, the 
forest, dryland, wetland, range, urban, suburban and rural environment; (2 )  
current and foreseeable trends in the quality, management and utilization of 
such environments and the effects of those trends on the social, economic, and 
other requirements of the Nation; (3 )  the adequacy of available natural re- 
sources for fulfilling human and economic requirements of the Nation in the 
light of expected population pressures; (4 )  a review of the programs and 
activities (including regulatory activities) of the Federal Government, the 
State and local governments, and nongovernmental entities or individuals w ith  
particular reference to their effect on the environment and on the conserva­
tion, developnient and utilization of natural resources; and (5 )  a program for 
remedying the deficiencies of existing programs and activities, together with 
recommendations for legislation.
Sec. 202. There is created in the Executive Office of the President a 
Council on Environmental Q uality  (hereinafter referred to as the "Council” ) .  
T he Council shall be composed of three members who shall be appointed by 
the President to serve a t his pleasure, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. T h e  President shall designate one of the members of the Council 
to serve as Chairman. Each member shall be a person who, as a result of his 
training, experience, and attainments, is exceptionally well qualified to 
analyze and interpret environmental trends and information of all kinds; to 
appraise programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of 
the policy set forth in title I  of this Act ; to be conscious of and responsive to 
the scientific, economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs and interests of 
the Nation; and to formulate and recommend national policies to promote the 
improvement of the quality of the environment.
Sec. 203. T h e  Council may employ such officers and employees as may 
be necessary to carry out its functions under this Act. In  addition, the 
Council may employ and fix the compensation of such experts and consultants 
as may be necessary for the carrying out of its functions under this Act, in  
accordance w ith section 3109 of title  5, United States Code (but without 
regard to the last sentence thereof).
Sec. 204. I t  shall be the duty and function of the Council—•
(1 )  T o  assist and advise the President in the preparation of the En­
vironmental Q uality Report required by section 201 ;
(2 )  T o  gather timely and authoritative information concerning the 
conditions and trends in the quality of the environment both current and 
prospective, to analyze and interpret such information for the purpose of 
determining whether such conditions and trends are interfering, or are 
likely to interfere, w ith the achievement of the policy set forth in  title I  
of this Act, and to compile and submit to the President studies relating to 
such conditions and trends;
(3 )  T o  review and appraise the various programs and activities of 
the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in title I  of 
this Act for the purpose of determining the extent to which such pro­
grams and activities are contributing to the achievement of such policy, 
and to make recommendations to the President w ith  respect thereto;
(4 )  T o  develop and recommend to the President national policies to 
foster and promote the improvement of environmental quality to meet 
the conservation, social, economic, health, and other requirements and 
goals of the Nation;
(5 )  T o  conduct investigations, studies, surveys, research, and analyses 
relating to ecological systems and environmental quality;
(6 )  T o  document and define changes in the natural environment, 
including the plant and animal systems, and to accumulate necessary
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data and other information for a continuing analysis of these changes 
or trends and an interpretation of their underlying causes;
(7 )  T o  report at least once each year to the President on the state 
and condition of the environment; and
(8 )  T o  make and furnish such studies, reports thereon, and recom­
mendations w ith respect to matters of policy and legislation as the 
President may request.
Sec. 203. In  exercising its powers, functions, and duties under this Act, 
the Council shall—
(1 )  Consult with the Citizens' Advisory Cummittee on Environmental 
Q uality established by Executive O rder No. 11472, dated M ay 29, 1969, 
and w ith such representatives of science, industry, agriculture, labor, 
conservation organizations. State and local governments and other groups, 
as it deems advisable ; and
(2 )  U tilize , to the fullest extent possible, the services, facilities and 
information (including statistical information) of public and private 
agencies and organizations, and individuals, in  order that duplication 
of effort and expense may be avoided, thus a.ssuring that the Council’s 
activities w ill not unnecessarily overlap or conflict w ith similar activities 
authorized by law and performed by established agencies.
Sec. 206. Members of the Council shall serve full time and the Chair­
man of the Council shall be compensated at the rate provided for Level I I  of 
the Executive Schedule Pay Rates (5  U .S.C . 5313 ). The other members of 
the Council shall be compensated at the rate provided for Level I V  of the 
Executive Schedule Pay Rates (5  U .S .C . 5 3 1 5 ).
Sec. 207. There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the pro­
visions of this Act not to exceed $300,000 for fiscal year 1970, $700,000 for 
fiscal year 1971, and $1 million for each fiscal year thereafter.
Approved January 1, 1970.
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Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental 
Protection Act of 1970 
.Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 691.1201-1207 (Supp. 1972).
The People of the State of Michigan enact:
Sec. 1. This act, shall he known and may he cited as the 
"Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell environmental protection 
act of 1970."
Sec. 2. (l) The attorney general, any political subdivision
of the state, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of 
a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, cor­
poration, association, organization or other legal entity may 
maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction 
where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for ' 
declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any politi­
cal subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the 
state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partner­
ship, corporation, association, organization or other legal en­
tity for the protection of the air, water and other natural 
resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impair­
ment or destruction.
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (l) where is 
involved a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution de­
vice or procedure, fixed by rule or otherwise, by an instru­
mentality or agency of the state or a political subdivision 
thereof, the court may:
(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonable­
ness of the standard.
(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct 
the adoption of a standard approved and specified by the court.
Sec. 2a. If the court has reasonable ground to doubt the 
solvency of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's ability to pay 
any cost or judgment which might be rendered against him in 
an action brou^t under this act the court may order the plain­
tiff to post a surety bond or cash not to exceed $500.00.
Sec. 3. (l) When the plaintiff in the action has made a
prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant has, or 
is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water or 
other natural resources or the public trust therein, the de­
fendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission 
of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also show, 
by way of an affirmative defense, that there is no feasible 
and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that such 
conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public health, 
safety and welfare in light of the state's paramount concern 
for the protection of its natural resources from pollution, 
impairment or destinaction. Except as to the affirmative de­
fense, the principles of burden of proof and wei^t of the
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evidence generally applicable in civil actions in the cir­
cuit courts shall apply to actions brought under this act.
(2) The court may appoint a master or referee, who shall 
be a disinterested person and technically qualified, to 
take testimony and make a record and a report of his find­
ings to the court in the action.
(3) Costs may be apportioned to the parties if the 
interests of justice require.
Sec. 4. (l) The court may grant temporary and permanent
equitable relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant 
that are required to protect the air, water and other natural 
resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impair­
ment or destruction.
(2) If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are 
required or available to determine the legality of the defen­
dant's conduct, the court may remit the parties to such pro­
ceedings, which proceedings shall be conducted in accordance 
with and subject to the provisions of Act No. 305 of the 
Public Acts of 1969» being sections 24.201 to 24.313 of the 
Compiled Laws of 1948. In so remitting the court may grant 
temporary equitable relief where necessary for the protec­
tion of the air, water and other natural resources or the 
public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruc­
tion. In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction 
of the action pending completion thereof for the purpose
of determining whether adequate protection from pollution, 
impairment or destruction has been afforded.
(3) Upon completion of such proceedings, the court shall 
adjudicate the impact of the defendant's conduct on the air, 
water or other natural resources and on the public trust 
therein in accordance with this act. In such adjudication 
the court may order that additional evidence be taken to 
the extent necessary to protect the rights recognized in 
this act.
(4) Where, as to any administrative, licensing or other 
proceeding, judicial review thereof is available, notwith-
. standing the provisions to the contrary of Act No. 306 of 
the Public Acts of I969, pertaining to judicial review, 
the court originally taking jurisdiction shall maintain 
jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review.
Sec. 5. (1) Whenever administrative, licensing or other
proceedings and judicial review thereof are available by 
law, the agency or the court may permit the attorney gener­
al, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumen­
tality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision 
thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, 
organization or other legal entity to intervene as a party 
on the filing of a pleading asserting that the proceeding 
or action for judicial review involves conduct which has, 
or which is likely to have, the effect of polluting, im­
pairing or destroying the air, water or other natural 
resources or the public trust therein.
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(2) In any such administrative, licensing or other pro­
ceedings, and in any judicial review thereof, any alleged 
pollution, impairment or destruction of the air, water or 
other natural resources or the public trust therein, shall 
be determined, and no conduct shall be authorized or ap­
proved which does, or is likely to have such effect so 
long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative con­
sistent with the reasonable requirements of the public 
health, safety and welfare.
(3) The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res 
judicata may be applied by the court to prevent multipli­
city of suits.
Sec. 6. This act shall be supplementary to existing 
administrative and regulatory procedures provided by law.
Sec. 7- This act shall take effect October 1, 1970.
This act is ordered to take immediate effect.
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NOTES
1. Robert L. Heilbroner, Between Capitalism and Socialism, (New York:
Vintage, 1970), p. 269.
2. Ibid., pp. 269-70.
3. Ibid., p. 270.
k. For example, environmental groups have established the Washington,
D.C.-based Environmentalists for Full Employment, a coalition 
focussing on labor-intensive technologies that will provide jobs 
with reduced environmental impact. In addition, the Walter and 
Mary Reuther Education Center recently hosted a conference on 
justice, jobs, and environment. It attracted representatives of 
labor, social, cultural, and environmental groups.
5. For these and other insights on the political pî oblems of the 
environmental movement, see the general reports of the Explora­
tory Project for Economic Alternatives.
6. As noted by the National Wildlife Federation, nearly every major
index of environmental quality has declined since I969. These 
include the wildlife, living space, soil, minerals, water, timber, 
and air indices. The latter two have shown brief periods of 
stability or even improvement. The general trend is one of decreased 
quality, however. See "Sixth Environmental Quality Index: The Year
of the Trade-Off," National Wildlife, February-March, 1975.
7. There are numerous publications that can be consulted for information 
on environmental quality. The most comprehensive from the environ­
mental law angle is the Environmental Law Institute’s Environmental 
Law Reporter, Washington, D.C., hereinafter cited as ELR.
8. The non-degradation policy was unearthed in a recent lawsuit filed 
by the Sierra Club. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 2 ELR 20656 (D.C, 
Cir. 1972); affd. by split decision sub nom. Fri^v. Sierra Club,
1*12 U.S. 5^1 (1973). Even though the suit was resolved in the 
Club’s favor, the Environmental Protection Agency has not moved 
vigorously to implement the policy. EPA recently passed much of 
the responsibility for implementing non-degradation to the states 
where results are predictably slow-coming. For a good history of 
non-degradation, consult Erica L. Dolgin and Thomas G. P. Guilbert, 
eds.. Federal Environmental Law (St. Paul: West, 1974), pp. 1079-
1082. Therein is the compelling suggestion (at 1002) that the Clean 
Air Act should be used to re-orient our uncontrolled socio-economic 
system.
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9. See Train v. Colorado PIRG, l+U USLW 1+717.
10. The federal Walter Pollution Control Act is 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.
11. Consult U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
National Land Use Policy (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), and U.S. Senate Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Hearings ... on S. 268 (Washington, D.C. :
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973). See also Public Land Law 
Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land, PLLRC Report 
to the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1970); and Hamilton K. Pyles, ed., What's Ahead for Our 
Public Lands? (Washington, D.C.; Natural Resources Council of 
America, 1970).
12. Energy policy has been the subject of much federal activity. A 
piecemeal approach, focussed mostly on the price of oil and gas, . 
has been enacted. However, even a cursory review of leading 
energy policy studies reveals clearly that the basic dimensions 
of a natural energy policy are non-existent. See, e.g., Energy 
Policy Project of the Ford Foundation, A Time to Choose (Cambridge: 
Ballinger Publishing Co., 197*+) ; and Wilson Clark, Energy for 
Survival (Garden City: Doubleday, 1975)-
13. See Fred Bosselman and David Callies. The Quiet Revolution in Land 
Use Control (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1971; Elizabeth Hushell, Environmental Management: Nine States
Look for Answers, (April, 1971, no address); and Randall W. Scott, 
ed., The Management and Control of Growth (Washington, D.C. : Urban
Land Institute, 1975), 3 Volumes.
1*+. 29 U.S.C. 651.
15. This is the case even though some 1+10 billion pounds of the 50 
most toxic chemicals were produced last year. See National Wildlife 
Federation, Conservation Report, No. 1, January 23, 197^.
16. The Federal Council on Environmental Quality receives copies of all 
federal environmental impact statements. CEQ writes sometimes 
stinging memoranda in review of these statements, however, agencies 
are not bound by the CEQ comments and often ignore them, A case 
pending before the U.S. Supreme Court could give the CEQ position 
"great weight" in a court of law (Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. 
Gribble, 4 ELR 20069)- CEQ also publishes guidelines that supposedly 
assist agencies in the preparation of environmental statements, 
annual reports, and occasional papers, a couple of which, including 
Fred Bosselman, et. al., The Taking Issue (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1973), and The Quiet Revolution in Land 
Use Control, op. cit. have been very helpful. Consult "The National
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Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Working, How It Should Work,"
L ELR 10003; "Supreme Court Users in New Era for CEQ in Warm 
Springs Case," 1+ ELR 10131 ; and "CEQ: Enforcer of NEPA's
Substantive Policies?" Houston Law Review, 12 (1975): 1110.
17. Cited in Sierra Club Bulletin, 52(9) (1967): P- 113. George
Perkins Marsh made the same point in his pioneering study Man and 
Nature in the l86o’s. See also Oliver S. Owen, Natural Resource 
Conservation (New York: MacMillan Co., 1971), p. 15-
18. See Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Knopf, 1971);
and Garrett Hardin, Population, Evolution, and Birth Control 
(San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 19^9)«
19. Eugene Odum, Ecology (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Wilson, 1963),
pp. 1» 6.
20. The news now bristles with specials on carcinogens. CBS news had
a television special in mid-October, 1975- The Wall Street Journal, 
Time, and Newsweek have reported the chilling probabilities. See 
Time, August 11, 1975> and October 20, 1975; Newsweek, January 19, 197^; 
and Deborah Shapley, "NitrosarainesScience, 191» January 26, 1976,
p. 268.
21. See Harold Green, "The Resolution of Uncertainty," Natural Resources
Journal (April, 1972): l82.
22. Benjamin Horace Hibbard, A History of the Public Lands (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, I965), p. 39- For an alternative, 
though somewhat vague explanation, consult Frank M, Johnson, "The 
Rectangular System of Surveying," reported in S, V. Proudfit, Public 
Land System of the United States (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1924), pp. 12-l4.
23. The notable exception is the conservation movement’s pressure for 
an early commitment to the more sensible use of forest resources.
Consult Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959)-
24. President’s Materials Policy Commission, Resources for Freedom
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952).
25. See Robert Sherill, "The Industry’s Fright Campaign," The Nation,
June 26, 1972, p. 816. Alleging that the oil crisis of 1974 was 
artifically induced does not mean that a more genuine crisis is 
not around the corner. In fact, the "crisis" was an excellent 
opportunity to learn ways to wind down the economy. That oppor­
tunity was not taken, however; instead, it produced the ill- 
advised Project Independence, an effort that has been aptly described 
e:> sticking our heads in the sand and hoping for oil. See Charles
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Peters and Glenn Allerhand, "The Case Against Project Independence," 
Washington Monthly, September, 1975, p. 19*
There is a good chance too that the "crisis" slowed some of the 
least justifiable energy and fuel-intensive comsunç)tion activities, 
such as second-home resorts. See Philip Weinberg, "Contrived 
Crisis," Buffalo Law Review 23 (197^): ^35.
2 6. Donella H. Meadows, et. al., The Limits of Growth (New York: 
Universe Books, 1972, Chapter I. See also Paul R. and Ann H. 
Ehrlich, Population, Resources, Environment (San Francisco:
W. H. Freeman, 1974).
27. See, e.g., Melvin Kranzberg, "Can Technological Progress Provide 
for the Future?" in Weintraub et. al., The Economic Growth 
Controversy (White Plains, K.Y.: International Arts and Sciences
Press, Inc., 1973), p. 62. For a more confused account by the
mining industry, see, e.g.. Sterling L. Slappey, "We're Headed
for a Minerals Crunch," Nation's Business 62 (December 1974):
21-24.
28. See Cross v. DeValle, 1 Wall. U.S. 5-
29. See, for example, Robert Pranger, The Eclipse of Citizenship
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Wilson, 1968); and tangentially,
Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960).
30. See the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.
31. See Appendix A for the text of the statute.
32. Appendix A, Sec. 102(2) (c).
33. Consult the writings of The Environmental Impact Assessment Project 
of the Institute of Ecology, a Washington, D.C.-based study of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, esp., John S. Winder, Jr. and 
Ruth Allen, The Impact Assessment Project, (Washington, D.C.:
The Institute of Ecology, 1975).
34. Arnold Bolle, "Public Participation in Environmental Policy," 
Natural Resources Journal 11 (l971):496.
35. James Morre, Federal Practice (New York: Matthew Bender, 1976),
pp. 65-133.
36. See "Changing the Burdens of Proof and Persuasion" below.
37. See text, supra note 46.
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38. See, for example, U.S. Department of the Interior, Coalvood 
Planning Unit (Miles City, Montana: Bureau of Land Management,
1975), p. 3.
3 9 . Joseph L. Sax, Defending the Environment (N.Y.: Vintage, 1970),
p. 63. See also, Simon Lazarus, The Genteel Populists (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 197^)-
1|0. See Pranger, op. cit.
kl. Hannah Arendt, ’’Seeing America Plain: A Bicentennial Address,
New York Review of Books, XXII (ll), June 26, 1975, P* 3.
k2. Lynton K. Caldwell, Man and His Environment: Policy and Administra- 
tion (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), p. lk9. There are critical 
issues to be raised concerning human ethical attitudes toward the 
environment. As noted elsewhere: "Unless man can re-think the
intellectual basis for his moral systems, and replace ancient mis­
conceptions with supportable normative conclusions about the real 
world and his place in it, he may prove incapable of aci/leving the 
knowledge, the patterns of life, or the political action for 
survival." Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "The Future of the Environmental 
Struggle," in Roy L. Meek and John A. Straager, eds., The Politics 
of Neglect (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), pp, 2k8-9- Too,
there is Aldo Leopold's early charge that "there is as yet no ethic 
dealing with man's relationship to land and to the non-human animals 
and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus* slave-girls, 
is still property. The land-relation is still economic, entailing 
privileges but not obligations." Aldo Leopold, "The Conservation 
Ethic," Journal of Forestry 31 (1933):63k, 635. This re-thinking is 
now underway —  at least in legal journals —  and it is too early to 
discern more than the general directions of the.debate. See, e.g., 
Christopher Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?" Southern Cal Law 
Review k5 (1972):k$0; Laurence Tribe, "Ways Not to Think About Plastic 
Trees," Yale Law Journal 83 (l97k): 1315J Mark Sagoff, "On Preserving 
the Natural Environment," Yale Law Journal 8k (l97k):205; Laurence 
Tribe, "From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures," 
Yale Law Journal 8k (1975):k80, and Harold 0, Hughes, "Who's Standing?" 
Environmental Law k (l97k):3lk.
See also the influential discussion of Christian environmental 
attitudes, Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
Crisis," Science 155 (19^7):1203; and Robert T. Roelofs, Joseph N. 
Crowley, and Donald L. Hardesty, eds.. Environment and Society 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 197k), Chapter 8.
Consider, too, the oratory of Indian chiefs. See John G. Neihardt, 
Black Elk.Speaks (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 19^1);
-150-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Virginia Irving Armstrong, I Have Spoken (Chicago: Swallow,
1971); and T. C. McLtihan, Touch the Earth (New York: Outerhridge
and Dienstfrey, 1971).
Trying to find similarly sensitive and respectful statements of 
ethical concern among present-day American political leaders is 
a disappointing search.
l»3. Ibid., p. 153.
4k. See Norman J. Landau and Paul D . Rheingold, The Environmental Law
Handbook (New York: Ballantine, 1971), pp. 30-32.
45. Ibid., pp. 28, 29.
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